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INTRODUCTION
T OXIC tort' litigation has emerged as a major social and legal
concern, 2 a development that has engendered numerous proposals
for legal reform. Many of these reforms would require institutional
1. This Article loosely defines toxic tort cases as those in which the plaintiff seeks
compensation for harm allegedly caused by exposure to a substance that increases the
risk of contracting a serious disease, but does not cause an immediately apparent
response. These cases generally involve a period of latency or incubation prior to the
onset of the disease. In most cases the increased risk of the disease does not diminish
or dissipate, even with the cessation of exposure. The Article discusses exposure to
radiation as well as to chemicals, and considers some cases involving drugs because
many of the causation issues are similar to those in environmental or occupational
cases. It also considers birth defect cases. The vast majority of toxic tort cases,
however, are related to cancer and the issue of carcinogenesis, and thus, parts of this
Article focus only on cancer and its causes.
2. One commentator notes that "[e]ven without a crystal ball, it is easy to see a
wave of cancer litigation on the horizon." Shelton, Defending Cancer Litigation:
The Causation Defense, For The Defense, January 1982, at 8, 14. Another cites
asbestos litigation as indicative of the trend, and points out that "there are more than
15,000 asbestos related cases now pending, and additional cases are being filed at the
rate of over 400 each month; it has been estimated that over 30,000 additional suits
will be filed in the next 25 years." Olick, Chapter 11-A Dubious Solution To
Massive Toxic Tort Liability, 18 Forum 361, 361 (1983). Also part of the trend are
claims brought by people alleging harm from exposure to dioxin. See Long & Han-
son, Dioxin Issue Focuses on Three Major Controversies in U.S., Chem. & Eng'g
News, June 6, 1983, at 23, 24. One accident involving dioxin at a West Virginia
chemical plant has resulted in claims totaling 700 million dollars. Webber, Dioxin
Liability is Huge Problem for Companies, Courts, Chem. & Eng'g News, June 6,
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innovations, such as administrative funds from which claimants could
obtain compensation with relatively little evidence of causation. 3
Most, however, would also allow recovery under existing tort theo-
ries. 4 Thus, questions about the application of common law principles
in evaluating evidence of causation in toxic tort cases remain open.5
1983, at 57, 59. For other examples, see Note, Establishing Causation in Chemical
Exposure Cases: The Precursor Symptoms Theory, 35 Rutgers L. Rev. 163, 164 n.2
(1982) [hereinafter cited as Precursor Symptoms].
3. See, e.g., Ginsberg & Weiss, Common Law Liability for Toxic Torts: A
Phantom Remedy, 9 Hofstra L. Rev. 859, 928-40 (1981); Milhollin, Long-Term
Liability for Environmental Harm, 41 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1, 16-25 (1979); Trauberman,
Statutory Reform of "Toxic Torts": Relieving Legal, Scientific and Economic Bur-
dens on the Chemical Victim, 7 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 177, 237, 243 (1983).
Perhaps the best known proposals for changes in the law are those made by the
Superfund Section 301(e) Study Group (Study Group), which was appointed pursu-
ant to Section 301(e) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 9601 et seq. (Supp. V 1981)). The Study Group submitted a report to
Congress in September 1982 that recommended the creation of rebuttable presump-
tions of causation to facilitate access to an administrative victim compensation fund.
"Superfund Section 301(e) Study Group," 97th Cong., 2d Sess., Injuries and Dam-
ages From Hazardous Wastes-Analysis and Improvement of Legal Remedies-
Report to Congress in Compliance with Section 301(e) of the Comprehensive Envi-
ronmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (P.L. 96-510) 213-25
(Comm. Print 1982) [hereinafter cited as 301(e) Study].
4. The only proposal of which the authors are aware that would eliminate tort
law in the area of toxic exposure litigation is that of Ginsberg and Weiss. See
Ginsberg & Weiss, supra note 3, at 932.
5. The 301(e) Study recommended the creation of rebuttable presumptions of
causation in favor of plaintiffs seeking compensation from an administrative fund.
See supra note 3. While the Study did not recommend that its presumptions carry
over to tort actions, neither did it recommend against such a step. 301(e) Study,
supra note 3, at 260. Some commentators have affirmatively proposed this. See, e.g.,
Burcat, Uncompensated Victims of Low-Level Radiation: Unnecessary Hostages of
the Price-Anderson Act Debate, 15 Forum 847, 859 (1980); Delgado, Beyond Sindell:
Relaxation of Cause-In-Fact Rules for Indeterminate Plaintiffs, 70 Calif. L. Rev.
881, 899 (1982); Note, The Inapplicability of Traditional Tort Analysis to Environ-
mental Risks: The Example of Toxic Waste Pollution Victim Compensation, 35 Stan.
L. Rev. 575, 615 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Environmental Risks]; Note, Tort
Actions for Cancer; Deterrence, Compensation, and Environmental Carcinogenesis,
90 Yale L.J. 840, 855 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Tort Actions for Cancer]. Other
commentators have suggested evidentiary standards that are stacked in favor of
plaintiffs though not couched in terms of presumptions. See, e.g., Hall & Silbergeld,
Reappraising Epidemiology: A Response to Mr. Dore, 7 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 441,
444-45 (1983); Precursor Symptoms, supra note 2, at 189-90.
Some commentators have proposed proportional liability as an alternative to the
traditional all-or-nothing recovery approach. See, e.g., Delgado, supra, at 899-902;
Rizzo & Arnold, Causal Apportionment in the Law of Torts; An Economic Theory,
80 Colum. L. Rev. 1399, 1407-13 (1980); Robinson, Multiple Causation in Tort
Law: Reflections on the DES Cases, 68 Va. L. Rev. 713, 755-58 (1982); Rosenberg,
The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law" Vision of the Tort
System, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 849, 881-87 (1984). The theory underlying these proposals
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This Article focuses on the use of the traditional preponderance-of-
the-evidence standard of proof in toxic tort cases in which a single
substance is at issue.6 Courts have found it difficult to apply this
standard to the kind of evidence seen in toxic tort litigation, and as a
result, have sometimes allowed recovery based on highly suspect evi-
dence, 7 or conversely, have failed adequately to justify the exclusion of
evidence."
has not been developed fully, however, and such a reform may be inappropriate for
single-factor cases. Multi-factor cases may provide stronger justification for propor-
tional liability, but its rational use would require the application of evidentiary tests
very similar to the one proposed in this Article. See infra pt. V(B).
6. While many cases involve allegations that a number of substances combined
to cause a plaintiff's disease, the analysis in this Article is confined to cases in which a
plaintiff is exposed to a single identifiable substance and subsequently contracts a
disease. The disease is known to arise without the identified exposure, but the
plaintiff nonetheless links his or her case to that exposure. Examples include litigation
about asbestos, Agent Orange and radiation. Of course, all of these cases involve at
least two factors: the substance at issue and whatever other factor(s) (for example,
diet or exposure to other substances) are responsible for the background incidence
rate of the disease. They are single-factor cases in the legal sense, however, because
liability will attach, if at all, to the one identifiable factor.
Cases in which the accused substance allegedly interacted with other factors
involve issues not addressed in this Article. Also unaddressed are cases involving two
or more identifiable factors, each independently sufficient to cause the injury at
issue. When more than one factor is a source of potential liability, however, the
epidemiologic concept of attributable risk, upon which this Article is based, still
provides the only scientifically valid factual basis for legal analysis. For example, a
lung cancer victim exposed to both benzene and cigarettes might be able to attribute
60 % of the risk to cigarettes, 20 % to benzene, and 20 % to unknown factors. These
attributable risks are either additive or multiplicative (in lay terms "synergistic"). If
the former, the analysis of this Article can be applied with little further elaboration;
if the latter, other rules of attribution are required.
7. The full extent of this problem is not revealed by published decisions. Often
when a plaintiff with an unsubstantiated claim wins a verdict after presenting very
questionable evidence, the defendant will simply settle. The lack of clear standards
turns appellate review into a crapshoot with the dice loaded for the plaintiff. A
recent example is instructive. In Grasso v. B.F. Goodrich Co., No. 78-1562 (D.N.J.
Jan. 30, 1981), the plaintiff alleged that his liver cancer (angiosarcoma) had been
caused by vinyl chloride (VC) from a factory located near his home. The expert
witness called by the plaintiff to establish this theory of "neighborhood cancer"
testified that, in addition to the plaintiff, eight documented cases of angiosarcoma
had occurred within two miles of an industrial plant using VC. Trial Transcript at
97, Grasso. The expert, however, did not substantiate his conclusion about causa-
tion. Although he acknowledged that angiosarcoma could occur without any expo-
sure, id. at 182, and that 75 % of all cases were of unknown origin, id. at 121, he took
the position that diagnosis of angiosarcoma and proximity to an emitting VC source
would suffice to establish VC as the cause. Id. at 177-78. He also seemed unwilling or
unable to distinguish between an explanation that is "more likely than not" correct
and one that is "the most likely" of several explanations. Id. at 112-13. Despite this
weak evidence, the jury returned a plaintiff's verdict that the trial court refused to set
aside. An appeal was taken, but the case was settled before argument. A clear
1984] 735
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These problems can be overcome, however, if courts apply recog-
nized epidemiologic principles and concepts in conjunction with the
traditional standard of proof. Epidemiology is the only generally
accepted scientific discipline that deals with the integrated use of
statistics and biological/medical science to identify and establish the
causes of human diseases.9 Its use enables scientific estimation of the
percentage of the risk of a disease that is properly attributable to a
given factor, such as exposure to an allegedly harmful substance.
Thus, use of an epidemiologic standard would provide courts with a
rational and consistent means for evaluating evidence of a causal
relationship between exposure to a particular factor and the incidence
of a disease.
evidentiary standard might have prevented the initiation of a case like Grasso, and
surely would have made it easier to take the case from the jury or to argue for
reversal on appeal.
Counsel to one major chemical company has publicly lamented the ease with
which plaintiffs can obtain settlements in toxic exposure cases. He attributes the
problem to complexity and expense of defense as well as to the uncertainty of the
outcome at trial. Sheridan, Rethinking Mass Tort Defense, Litigation, Summer 1983,
at 29, 29-30.
8. Two recent cases in the District of Columbia, both involving the anti-
morning sickness drug Bendectin, illustrate the problems courts have in justifying the
exclusion of patently insufficient evidence at the outset of a trial, or in taking a case
from the jury if no other evidence is introduced during the trial. In Koller v.
Richardson-Merrell, Inc., No. 80-1258 (D.D.C. filed Feb. 25, 1983) the plaintiff
alleged that her birth defects had been caused by Bendectin manufactured by the
defendant and taken by her mother during pregnancy. The court, in a preliminary
order, required that all statistical evidence be significant at a 95% confidence level.
Id. at 1. This kept certain causation testimony out of the trial, which the plaintiff
lost. Neither the order nor the memorandum opinion indicate what is meant by
"significance," however. If the reference is simply to the existence of a significant
difference between children of mothers who took Bendectin and those who did not,
the ruling makes sense, but if the reference goes to complicated statistics such as the
risk ratio, significance testing makes little sense. See infra pt. II.
In Oxendine v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., No. 1245-82 (Super. Ct. D.C.
filed Sept. 1, 1983), the judge allowed the testimony that had been excluded in
Koller. After a jury verdict for the plaintiff, however, the court granted a judgment
n.o.v. The judge found no evidence that Bendectin could cause birth defects, id. at 2,
although the plaintiff's expert testified that 21 of 1,000 children born to mothers who
had taken Bendectin would have defects compared to no more than 20 of 1,000
children born to mothers who had not. Trial Transcript at 108-09, Oxendine. These
statistics are evidence that the drug causes some birth defects, though at most only a
very small percentage. The judge would have been on much firmer ground had he
found the evidence insufficient to satisfy the more-likely-than-not test rather than
finding that it showed nothing at all.
9. Epidemiology is a well-established science tracing its roots back at least 150
years. While not a required part of the typical medical school curriculum, it is taught
at most schools. Epidemiologists are not necessarily medical doctors, but many do
have M.D.'s. The discussion of epidemiology, infra pt. II, explains at some length the
discipline's relationship to other sciences.
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This Article's underlying premise is that a toxic tort plaintiff, like
any other tort plaintiff, has the burden of proving each element of his
case 10, including causation."1 This burden includes the production of
evidence from which the factfinder could reasonably infer that the
accused substance "more likely than not" caused the plaintiffs
harm. 12 The plaintiff must introduce evidence of both the substance's
harmfulness at a given exposure level, and of his exposure to the
10. "Burden of proof" is an unfortunately ambiguous term that incorporates both
the burden of producing evidence and the ultimate burden of persuasion. See
Laughlin, The Location of the Burden of Persuasion, 18 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 3, 3 (1956).
Inasmuch as this Article deals with the sufficiency of evidence, it is about the burden
of production. See Dworkin, Easy Cases, Bad Law, and Burdens of Proof, 25 Vand.
L. Rev. 1151, 1160 (1972). Courts and commentators have considered a number of
factors in discussions of how the burden of proof (production or persuasion) should be
allocated. These can be grouped under a few broad headings: probability, access to
evidence and policy. See infra notes 135-42 and accompanying text. The general rule
is that the "burdens of pleading and proof with regard to most facts have been and
should be assigned to the plaintiff who generally seeks to change the present state of
affairs and who therefore naturally should be expected to bear the risk of failure of
proof or persuasion." E. Cleary, McCormick's Handbook on the Law of Evidence
§ 337, at 786 (2d ed. 1972).
11. Like "burden of proof," "causation" has been the source of much confusion.
The law distinguishes between "cause in fact" and "proximate cause." The former is
simply a matter of what has, in fact, occurred. See W. Prosser, Law of Torts § 41, at
237 (4th ed. 1971). The latter is a matter of law. Id. § 42, at 244. This Article is
concerned solely with the issue of cause in fact, on which:
as on other issues essential to his cause of action for negligence, the plaintiff
... has the burden of proof. He must introduce evidence which affords a
reasonable basis for the conclusion that it is more likely than not that the
conduct of the defendant was a substantial factor in bringing about the
result.
Id. § 41, at 241 (footnote omitted). Although this language seems restricted to
negligence actions, Dean Prosser made clear that causation is also an essential ele-
ment for any other tort. Id.
The "substantial factor" concept was developed to enable the law to deal with
situations in which two or more factors combine to bring about a plaintiff's injury. It
does not apply to cases in which factors have acted independently. See Delgado,
supra note 5, at 886-87 & n.26 (referring to "material and contributing" factors, but
citing the discussion of "substantial factors" in W. Prosser, supra, § 41, at 240-41).
Because this Article is restricted to fact patterns involving a single identifiable factor,
the "substantial factor" element in Dean Prosser's analysis need not be addressed.
12. Even commentators who have advocated changes to make it easier for plain-
tiffs to recover in toxic tort cases have explicitly recognized that the more-likely-than-
not test is the present rule. See Hall & Silbergeld, supra note 5, at 446; Trauberman,
supra note 5, at 197; Environmental Risks, supra note 5, at 578; Tort Actions for
Cancer, supra note 5, at 857 n.77; see also Precursor Symptoms, supra note 2, at 193,
in which the author explicitly states that the Note's theory requires placing the
burden of uncertainty on defendants. The rationale for placing the burden of proof
on plaintiffs and for requiring evidence sufficient to establish that the plaintiffs'
allegations are more likely than not true is discussed infra pt. III(A).
1984] 737
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substance at or above that level.' 3 Because most toxic tort cases involve
diseases with long latency or incubation periods, and because many of
these diseases may occur in the absence of any identifiable exposure,
causation very often becomes a central and complex issue at trial. 14 To
resolve this issue, plaintiffs usually must resort to expert witnesses' 5
who, unfortunately, sometimes venture opinions unsupported by sci-
entific data. 16 Moreover, while the outcome of many cases depends on
the legal sufficiency of such evidence, 17 courts have not been able to
decide the sufficiency issue either clearly or consistently.
13. See 301(e) Study, supra note 3, at 70-71. The standard this Article proposes
pertains principally, but not exclusively, to the harmfulness aspect of causation.
Unlike proof of harmfulness, proof of individual exposure generally depends on more
traditional evidence. For a case that turned on the distinction between harmfulness
and exposure, see Besner v. Walter Kidde Nuclear Lab., 18 A.D.2d 952, 952, 237
N.Y.S.2d 585, 587 (1963) (holding that the plaintiff had not established causation
because the only expert witness who testified about a causal relationship "based his
opinion on a completely erroneous premise as to the length of exposure involved and/
or a set of facts as to the amount, nature or duration of the alleged exposure
unsubstantiated by the record"). The case was remanded and the plaintiff won again
below. The defendant once more appealed, but the plaintiff prevailed. He had been
able to establish exposure "for a substantial part of two periods and also at other
times in various amounts." Besner v. Walter Kidde Nuclear Lab., 24 A.D.2d 1045,
1045, 265 N.Y.S.2d 312, 313 (1965).
14. See Tort Actions for Cancer, supra note 5, at 851-55; see, e.g., Boldt v.
Josten's, Inc., 261 N.W.2d 92, 94 (Minn. 1977); Miller v. National Cabinet Co., 8
N.Y.2d 277, 282-83, 168 N.E.2d 811, 813-14, 204 N.Y.S.2d 129, 132-33 (1960);
Clark v. Workmen's Comp. Comm'r, 155 W. Va. 726, 731-34, 187 S.E.2d 213, 216-
18 (1972).
15. See Taylor, Occupational Disease: A Defense Attorney's Point of Vieu3, 12
Forum 297, 299 (1976); Trauberman, supra note 3, at 189 n.4.
16. An example of this is provided by an expert who testified in several of the
swine flu cases. See infra pt. IV(B)(3). In one case he opined that the plaintiff's
arthritis had been caused by her swine flu inoculation. Gicas v. United States, 508 F.
Supp. 217, 220 (E.D. Wis. 1981). The court found:
that the overwhelming weight of the medical literature opposes a theory
that associates Swine Flu vaccine to the plaintiff's injuries. No authority
other than [the expert] has causally related rheumatoid arthritis with a
swine flu inoculation .... [The expert] knows of no evidence other than
this case that supports his theory.
Id. Faced with the same expert's testimony in another case, the court noted that
"[t]he posture of the expert testimony in this case indicates the limited usefulness that
such testimony offers a trier of fact." Latinovich v. United States, 537 F. Supp. 671,
676 (E.D. Wis. 1982). The court went on to list a number of other cases in which his
theories had been rejected. Id. This expert was also explicitly rejected in Kubs v.
United States, 537 F. Supp. 560, 563 (E.D. Wis. 1982).
17. A distinction must be drawn between sufficiency and admissibility. Insuffi-
cient evidence may be admissible, but if this is all that a plaintiff can offer, as a
matter of law, he cannot prevail. For discussions of the distinction between suffi-
ciency and admissibility, see Martin, The Uncertain Rule of Certainty: An Analysis
EPIDEMIOLOGIC PROOF
The first part of this Article examines the inconsistencies and defi-
ciencies in cases that have addressed the issue of causation. Courts
have recognized the need to infer causation in toxic tort cases from
differences between exposed and unexposed populations. At the same
time, they have tried to hold to basic tort law principles. Without a
test to measure causal inferences against legal principles, however,
their decisions have been ambiguous and confusing. The second part
of the Article provides an introduction to the principles of epidemiol-
ogy, which form the basis for a proposed standard that will enable
courts better to distinguish insufficient from sufficient evidence. Part
III establishes the basis for the premise that the preponderance-of-the-
evidence standard should apply in toxic tort cases, and it then com-
bines epidemiologic principles with this premise to formulate a stan-
dard for determining evidentiary sufficiency in toxic tort cases. The
proposed standard would require the plaintiff to establish that more
than fifty percent of the risk of developing the disease at issue be
attributable to the substance at issue, and that certain fundamental
epidemiologic postulates be satisfied. Part IV discusses precedents for
the use of epidemiologic principles by courts, and possible require-
ments for witnesses who testify as expert epidemiologists. Finally, the
Article addresses problems that might result from retaining the tradi-
tional burden of proof and using an evidentiary standard that requires
the accumulation of data about populations before an individual can
bring a successful action.
I. CAUSATION IN CANCER AND Toxic TORT CASES
A. Cancer Cases Involving Trauma or Irritation
Legal inquiry into the causation of cancer pre-dates toxic tort law,
and much of the early theory persists today. Plaintiffs often allege
causation from either a traumatic injury 8 or exposure to an immedi-
and Proposal For a Federal Evidence Rule, 20 Wayne L. Rev. 781, 797-802 (1974);
Musslewhite, Medical Causation Testimony in Texas: Possibility vs. Probability, 23
Sw. L.J. 622, 622 (1969); Note, Causation in Disease: Quantum of Proof Required to
Reach the Jury, 53 Nw. U.L. Rev. 794, 795-98 (1959).
18. E.g., Kramer Servs., Inc., v. Wilkins, 184 Miss. 483, 496, 186 So. 625, 627
(1939) (plaintiff alleged that his cancer had been caused by a cut he received when
broken glass fell on him); Stordahl v. Rush Implement Co., 148 Mont. 13, 14-16, 417
P.2d 95, 96-97 (1966) (cancer allegedly caused by blow to back); Casson v. A.C.
Horn Co., 27 A.D.2d 966, 966-67, 279 N.Y.S.2d 244, 245 (1967) (lung cancer
allegedly caused by inhaling paint fumes in work place accident); Hanna v. Aetna
Ins. Co., 24 Ohio Misc. 27, 28, 259 N.E.2d 177, 178 (1970) (breast cancer allegedly
caused by bruises suffered in automobile accident); Gambrell v. Burleson, 252 S.C.
98, 100, 165 S.E.2d 622, 622-23 (1969) (cancer allegedly aggravated by automobile
accident). Most of the injuries are single, isolated traumas, though some are repeated
1984]
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ately irritating or harmful substance, such as sand or sulfuric acid. 9
In adjudicating trauma claims, courts usually fail to recognize that
cancers generally develop without identifiable prior traumatic events,
and that incidence rates are no higher in groups that have suffered
single traumatic injuries than in those that have not.20 While appellate
decisions sometimes acknowledge the uncertainty and ignorance that
surround cancer, they often uphold plaintiffs' verdicts based on coin-
cidences lacking statistical significance.2' What little guidance medi-
cal science has provided about traumatic causation is frequently ig-
nored or misinterpreted.
In 1926, Dr. James Ewing outlined criteria for attributing a partic-
ular cancer to a trauma.22 Although these criteria were intended to
provide guidance to courts, Ewing cautioned that "[t]he traumatic
theory runs against too many general objections to permit its uncriti-
traumas more akin to physical irritation. For purposes of this Article, trauma will
mean single trauma.
19. E.g., Hagy v. Allied Chem. & Dye Corp., 122 Cal. App. 2d 361, 363, 265
P.2d 86, 87 (1953) (cancer allegedly caused or aggravated by exposure to sulfuric
acid); Bollinger v. Wagaraw Bldg. Supply Co., 122 N.J.L. 512, 514-15, 6 A.2d 396,
398-99 (1939) (plaintiff claimed that sand and ashes that had gotten into the dece-
dent's shoes had so aggravated a pigmented mole on one of his feet that it developed
into a cancer); Chalmers v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 72 Wash. 2d 595, 597, 434 P.2d
720, 721 (1967) (cancer allegedly caused by fumes so irritating they once caused
plaintiff's deceased husband to pass out); see Adelson, Injury and Cancer, 5 W. Res.
L. Rev. 150, 168-69 (1954); Dyke, Traumatic Cancer, 15 Clev.-Mar. L. Rev. 472,
484-94 (1966); Comment, Sufficiency of Proof in Traumatic Cancer: A Medico-
Legal Quandary, 16 Ark. L. Rev. 243, 256-67 (1962); Comment, Judicial Attitudes
Towards Legal and Scientific Proof of Cancer Causation, 3 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 344,
354-68 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Scientific Prooa]; Comment, Sufficiency of Proof
in Traumatic Cancer Cases, 46 Cornell L.Q. 581, 581-82 (1961) [hereinafter cited as
Sufficiency of Proof].
20. See Adelson, supra note 19, at 154-55; Auster, The Role of Trauma in
Oncogenesis: A Juridical Consideration, 175 J. A.M.A. 946, 949 (1961); Russell &
Clark, Medico-Legal Considerations of Trauma and Other External Influences in
Relationship to Cancer, 6 Vand. L. Rev. 868, 875 (1953); Warren, Criteria Required
to Prove Causation of Occupational or Traumatic Tumors, 10 U. Chi. L. Rev. 313,
318-20 (1943).
21. E.g., Hagy v. Allied Chem. & Dye Corp., 122 Cal. App. 2d 361, 375-76, 265
P.2d 86, 95 (1953); Daly v. Bergstedt, 267 Minn. 244, 248, 126 N.W.2d 242, 245
(1964); see Sufficiency of Proof, supra note 19, at 582 & n.10. See infra note 104 for a
discussion of what is meant by "statistical significance."
22. Ewing, The Relation of Trauma to Malignant Tumors, Am. J. Surgery, Feb.
1926, at 30, 31-34. The criteria set forth were:
(1) Authenticity and sufficient severity of the trauma.
(2) Previous integrity of wounded part.
(3) Identity of injured area with that giving origin to the tumor.
(4) Tumor of a type that could conceivably result from trauma.
(5) Proper time interval between receipt of the injury and appearance of the
tumor.
Id.
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cal acceptance."23 Moreover, he premised his work on the assumption
that the defendant has the burden of disproof,24 thus further limiting
the proper application of his postulates. By 1935, he had become still
more conservative, acknowledging that "experimental data reveal the
fact that cancer genesis requires quite peculiar factors which have not
been found in the results of simple trauma." 2s Later work by others
has further limited the Ewing approach.2 6
Ignorance and uncertainty make it virtually impossible, even with
the aid of Ewing's criteria, to determine whether a single trauma, or a
majority of irritating factors,2 7 more likely than not caused the initia-
tion of a latent disease such as cancer. Because plaintiffs bear the
burden of proof, this dearth of evidence logically implies that plain-
tiffs should generally lose as a matter of law, but few courts have
stated this explicitly.28 Instead, decisions have generally been ill-rea-
soned and inconsistent.2 9
23. Id. at 34.
24. Id. at 30.
25. Ewing, The Modern Attitude Toward Traumatic Cancer, 11 Bull. N.Y.
Acad. Med. 281, 281 (1935).
26. See Auster, supra note 20, at 949. No one has suggested that the Ewing
analysis can lead to a conclusion that a causal link is more probable than not. Rather,
only possible inference is claimed. One commentator has explicitly stated that the
postulates relate only to possibility. Adelson, supra note 19, at 156. Ewing's postu-
lates may, however, be used to support defendants' verdicts because the plaintiff
must at least satisfy them to prove causation. See Stordahl v. Rush Implement Co.,
148 Mont. 13, 19-20, 417 P.2d 95, 99 (1966); Sikora v. Apex Beverage Corp., 282
A.D. 193, 196, 122 N.Y.S.2d 64, 66 (1953), aff'd, 306 N.Y. 913, 119 N.E.2d 601
(1954); Dennison v. Wing, 279 A.D. 494, 496-97, 110 N.Y.S.2d 811, 813-14 (1952).
27. See Auster, supra note 20, at 949. In some prolonged irritation cases it may
be possible to infer causation with sufficient certainty. Ewing, supra note 25, at 314.
28. The only example of which the authors are aware is Tonkovich v. Depart-
ment of Labor & Indus., 31 Wash. 2d 220, 195 P.2d 638 (1948).
29. Compare Daly v. Bergstedt, 267 Minn. 244, 248, 126 N.W.2d 242, 245
(1964) (upholding plaintiffs claim that a bruise on her breast had become cancerous)
with Tonkovich v. Department of Labor & Indus., 31 Wash. 2d 220, 226-27, 195
P.2d 638, 641-42 (1948) (rejecting plaintiff's claim that fractured bones in his foot
worsened into arthritis and intestinal cancer 10 years later).
Plaintiffs' verdicts in workers' compensation cases, even in the absence of reliable
information, are perhaps understandable. The requirement that a disease be occupa-
tional conceptually parallels the tort law causation requirement, but it is not identi-
cal to it. See lB A. Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law § 41 (1982 & Supp. 1983);
see, e.g., Cox v. Ulysses Coop. Oil & Supply Co., 218 Kan. 428, 432-33, 544 P.2d
363, 367 (1975) (in a workers' compensation case the claimant need only introduce
evidence sufficient to convince the court that the award is proper); Deines v. Greer,
216 Kan. 548, 553, 532 P.2d 1257, 1262 (1975) (when injury shown to have arisen out
of course of employment, every natural consequence of injury is compensable);
Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 23 Pa. Commw. 454, 456,
352 A.2d 571, 572 (1976) (plaintiff need not prove injury caused by identifiable
incident, but rather only that injury arose in course of employment). Some states
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Daly v. Bergstedt ° typifies the muddled reasoning employed in
many trauma and irritation cases. The plaintiff brought a simple slip
and fall tort action, straightforward except for her claim that a bruise
on her left breast had caused it to become cancerous. The Minnesota
Supreme Court affirmed the plaintiff's verdict, but the court's review
of the evidence did not justify its holding. Six medical doctors testified
that there was no causal connection between the bruise and the
cancer, while one gave the opinion that the cancer could have devel-
oped from the trauma sustained in the fall. 31 Apparently realizing that
science weighed heavily in favor of the defendant, the court chose to
rely on the coincident location of the trauma and the cancer and the
relatively short (14 months) time period between the two. 32 This
approach totally ignores the absence of evidence that the incidence of
breast cancer is higher among women who have suffered trauma than
among women who have not. 33 The Daly case implies that it is
appropriate to allow laymen to draw conclusions from information
create presumptions that lessen the plaintiffs burden of proof. See, e.g., Downes v.
Industrial Comm'n, 113 Ariz. 90, 93, 546 P.2d 826, 829-30 (1976); Bolger v. Chris
Anderson Roofing Co., 112 N.J. Super. 383, 394, 271 A.2d 451, 457-58 (1970), aff'd
per curiam, 117 N.J. Super. 497, 285 A.2d 228 (1971). Compare Cox v. Ulysses
Coop. Oil & Supply Co., 218 Kan. 428, 435-36, 544 P.2d 363, 369-70 (1975)
(personal opinion of physician that causation is a "reasonable medical certainty" is
sufficient to justify recovery) with Parker v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 440
S.W.2d 43, 45 (Tex. 1969) (causal connection must be clearly established between
employment and injury to justify recovery).
30. 267 Minn. 244, 126 N.W.2d 242 (1964).
31. Id. at 248, 126 N.W.2d at 245. The court based its opinion on the Ewing
Postulates. Id. However, the postulates had not, in fact, been satisfied. Ewing made
it quite clear that only one type of breast cancer, carcinoma simplex, could be linked
to trauma, and that "in each case the entire clinical history must be secured and the
tumor and the entire breast must be examined by a competent tumor pathologist
before the basis can be laid for an opinion." Ewing, supra note 25, at 320-21. There
is no indication that Mrs. Daly produced such evidence. In fact, her expert had
testified that she had a scirrhus carcinoma, not carcinoma simplex. 267 Minn. at 249,
126 N.W.2d at 246. Even if the postulates had been satisfied, the plaintiff would still
not have established the causal link by a preponderance of the evidence. See supra
note 10.
32. 267 Minn. at 247-51, 126 N.W.2d at 245-47. Other courts have held that
while coincidence and expert testimony about possibilities by themselves are not
enough, together they may be sufficient. See Hagy v. Allied Chem. & Dye Corp., 122
Cal. App. 2d 361, 371, 265 P.2d 86, 92-93 (1953) (quoting Fireman's Fund Indem-
nity Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 93 Cal. App. 2d 244, 246, 208 P.2d 1033, 1034
(1949)). While plausible at first glance, this approach is in fact no better than that
taken by the Daly court. An expert is assumed to know'all the available facts relevant
to causation, and if he cannot reach a suitably certain conclusion laymen should not
be expected to do so. Stated another way, if proof of causation requires expert
testimony, the expert's determination of how certain one can be ought to be determi-
native.
33. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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found to be inadequate by experts, a rule that leaves little basis for a
rational analysis of the legal sufficiency of evidence. 34
Courts that have reviewed the sufficiency of expert testimony in
trauma and irritant cases have tended to go little beyond the witness'
expressed degree of certainty, distinguishing, for example, between
the use of the words "possible" and "probable." 35 Often they uncriti-
cally defer to physicians, 36 whose training and experience typically do
not qualify them to venture opinions about the probability that a
particular factor caused a disease.3 7 Focusing on the expressed cer-
tainty or supposed professional competence of physicians shifts atten-
tion from underlying uncertainty and permits at least apparent adher-
ence to the more-likely-than-not standard, but it does not lead to
consistent results.
The distinction between possibility and probability is not insignifi-
cant, but when reduced to a simple search for expressed certainty or
for the blessing of a suitably credentialed expert, it often has no real
effect. Judicial reluctance to examine the substantive basis of the
testimony can easily permit unfounded expressions of certainty to
carry the day. Pennsylvania, for example, requires that causation
34. Other decisions have also been based on this kind of limited review. See, e.g.,
Hagy v. Allied Chem. & Dye Corp., 122 Cal. App. 2d 361, 375-76, 265 P.2d 86, 95
(1953); Hanna v. Aetna Ins. Co., 24 Ohio Misc. 27, 32-33, 259 N.E.2d 177, 180-81
(1970); Valente v. Bourne Mills, 77 R.I. 274, 278, 75 A.2d 191, 194 (1950).
35. Cox v. Ulysses Coop. Oil & Supply Co., 218 Kan. 428, 435-36, 544 P.2d 363,
369-70 (1975); see Pucci v. Rausch, 51 Wis. 2d 513, 518-19, 187 N.W.2d 138, 141-42
(1971) (personal injury case in which the court required only that a doctor have
sufficient certainty that his opinion is "correct to a reasonable medical probability.
Other doctors may differ, but whether his opinion corresponds with that of another
member of the medical profession does not go to admissibility of his opinion but to
the weight the trier of the facts should give to his opinion."); City of Seymour v.
Industrial Comm'n, 25 Wis. 2d 482, 491-92, 131 N.W.2d 323, 328 (1964) (medical
testimony cannot be held "incredible because contrary to scientific facts or knowl-
edge").
The Pucci court listed with approval a number of cases in which various forms of
medical testimony had been either acceptable or unacceptable. 51 Wis. 2d at 519,
187 N.W.2d at 142. This approach can redound to the benefit of defendants as well
as plaintiffs. See Casson v. A.C. Horn Co., 27 A.D.2d 966, 967, 279 N.Y.S.2d 244,
245 (1967) (medical testimony sufficient); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Myers, 411
S.W.2d 710, 714 (Tex. 1966) (medical testimony that causation was merely possible
insufficient for recovery). See generally Annot., 66 A.L.R.2d 1082, 1118-24 (1959)(dealing with the issue of admissibility, not sufficiency, but citing many cases that
relate to the sufficiency issue).
36. See McGrath v. Irving, 24 A.D.2d 236, 238, 265 N.Y.S.2d 376, 378 (1965)
(plaintiff's expert testimony held sufficient based on his "medical qualifications").
37. When etiology is unknown, causation must usually be determined at least in
part from statistical inferences. Biostatisticians deal with this numerical aspect of
establishing causation, but they often lack a full appreciation of the biological aspect.
It is the epidemiologist who specializes in using both statistics and biology to arrive at
scientifically supportable conclusions about causation.
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testimony be couched in very certain terms, but an expert in Menarde
v. Philadelphia Transportation Co. 38 evaded this limitation simply by
testifying that it was virtually impossible that the plaintiffs breast
cancer had been caused by anything other than the minor injuries she
had suffered in a trolley car accident.3 9 This case clearly demonstrates
how neatly an expert can tailor testimony to the requirements set forth
in previous decisions. If certainty is needed, witnesses can be found
who will profess it.
B. Toxic Tort Cases
In toxic tort cases, latency and the absence of an identifiable irrita-
tion or traumatic injury have made it more difficult than in trauma
cases for courts to rely solely on coincidences. 40 Nevertheless, the focus
on witnesses' expressions of certainty and the deference to medical
experts seen in traumatic cancer cases have carried over to toxic torts.
In Boldt v. Jostens, Inc.,'41 for example, the plaintiff claimed that her
workplace exposure to fumes from heated glue caused her to contract
Goodpasture's Syndrome, a pathologic condition in which the kidneys
and lungs are attacked by one's own immune system. The doctor who
testified for the plaintiff about causation acknowledged that the etiol-
ogy of Goodpasture's Syndrome is unknown. He stated that it was
thought to be an immunologic disease, that the antigen causing a
reaction in a victim "can probably be many different things and
different for different people,"'42 and that it is unknown whether the
reaction is the result of one exposure or many.43 Yet, he was willing to
opine that the plaintiffs exposure to glue fumes "had a great deal to
do with her illness, and certainly caused aggravation. '44 The Supreme
Court of Minnesota held that this testimony sufficed to sustain a
workers' compensation award, in part because "the truth of the opin-
38. 376 Pa. 497, 103 A.2d 681 (1954).
39. Id. at 502, 103 A.2d at 684; see Peterson v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 259
S.W.2d 789, 794 (Mo. 1953).
40. Scientific Proof, supra note 19, at 354. But see Boney v. Gouverneur Talc
Co., 77 A.D.2d 702, 702, 430 N.Y.S.2d 399, 399 (1980) (lung cancer found to have
been caused by exposure to talc dust containing asbestos). The plaintiff in Boney
admittedly had talcosis, a form of pneumoconiosis. But other than testimony that this
condition might have predisposed him to contract cancer, there was apparently no
evidence to support holding the defendent liable for the disease. It should be noted
that while mesothelioma (which is not what the plaintiff had) is very clearly linked to
asbestos exposure, other forms of cancer are not, at least not to the same high degree.
This illustrates why specificity is so important in epidemiologic analysis. See supra
note 89 and accompanying text.
41. 261 N.W.2d 92 (Minn. 1977).
42. Id. at 93.
43. Id.
44. Id.
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ion need not be capable of demonstration." 45 Other cases indicate that
in some circumstances a treating physician's testimony will be given
special weight,46 or that a specialist's testimony will be given more
weight than a general practitioner's. 47
When courts do go beyond simple deference to medical testimony,
they generally do no more than subject it to the same cursory "proba-
bility versus possibility" analysis found in some trauma cases. 48 In
exposure cases this has at least proven useful in culling claims in which
a witness singles out one factor as the "most probable" of many. These
situations occur because when diagnosing and treating a disease, doc-
tors often cannot state with certainty which factor is its direct cause.
They quite properly think in terms of finding the most likely cause
instead of a factor that more likely than not is the cause.49 Thus terms
like "medical certainty" or "medical probability" often fail to satisfy
legal requirements. In Clark v. State Workmen's Compensation Com-
missioner,50 for example, the plaintiff established that the only clearly
identifiable cause of her deceased husband's leukemia was his expo-
sure to chemicals at the plant in which he had worked. 51 Her expert
had also testified, however, that the etiology of the disease was un-
known and that other factors could have caused it.52 The court held
that this evidence failed to satisfy the requirement that a workers'
compensation claimant prove that his disease is job-related. 53
Although scientific studies do not support the argument that
trauma increases the incidence of disease, data do exist that permit
comparisons of disease rates in populations exposed to some substances
with the rates in unexposed populations. 55 Such comparisons are a
45. Id. at 94. But see Logan Co. v. Amic, 479 S.W.2d 1, 2-3 (Ky. 1972) (hypoth-
esis of physician not sufficent evidence to justify plaintiff's recovery).
46. Long v. Martin Timber Co., 395 So. 2d 931, 934 (La. App. 1981); Groff v.
Department of Labor & Indus., 65 Wash. 2d 35, 45, 395 P.2d 633, 639 (1964);
Sufficiency of Proof, supra note 19, at 601.
47. Chalmers v. Department of Labor & Indus., 72 Wash. 2d 595, 598-601, 434
P.2d 720, 722-24 (1967); Sufficiency of Proof, supra note 19, at 601.
48. See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
49. See Danner & Sagall, Medicolegal Causation: A Source of Professional Mis-
understanding, 3 Am. J. Law & Med. 303, 304-05 (1977).
50. 155 W. Va. 726, 187 S.E.2d 213 (1972).
51. Id. at 728-29, 187 S.E.2d at 215.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 734, 187 S.E.2d at 217-18; see Schaefer v. Texas Employment Ins.
Ass'n, 612 S.W.2d 199, 205 (Tex. 1981) (rejecting medical testimony that it was
reasonably probable that workplace exposure caused decedent's cancer).
54. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
55. See, e.g., Doll & Peto, The Causes of Cancer: Quantitative Estimates of
Avoidable Risks of Cancer in the United States Today, 66 J. Nat'l Cancer Inst. 1192
19841
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
basic part of epidemiologic studies, and in a few cases, have led to
causal inferences so strong that courts have found causation to be
scientifically established without any analysis of the method and rea-
soning underlying that conclusion. 5 When the data are less conclu-
sive, as usually occurs in toxic tort cases, the law has had far more
difficulty in dealing with the evidence. A number of commentators
have referred approvingly to the use of epidemiology or biostatistics, 57
(1981); Wynder & Cori, Contribution of the Environment to Cancer Incidence: An
Epidemiologic Exercise, 57 J. Nat'l Cancer Inst. 825 (1977).
56. The link between asbestos and mesothelioma (a form of cancer that attacks
the lining of the pleural cavity) was not established until the early 1970's, just about
the time that the growing flood of legal action began. Mehaffy, Asbestos-Related
Lung Disease, 16 Forum 341, 344 (1980). Causation had been established by the
epidemiologic work of Dr. Irving J. Selikoff and others, and in the litigation it has
been substantially accepted. Without examining the methodology by which scientists
reached their conclusions, courts accept causation almost as a matter of law. See
Karjala v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 523 F.2d 155, 158 (8th Cir. 1975); Bertrand
v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 529 F. Supp. 539, 544 (D. Minn. 1982); Flatt v.
Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 488 F. Supp. 836, 841 (E.D. Tex. 1980); Mehaffy,
supra, at 341. But see Tretter v. Johns-Manville Corp., 88 F.R.D. 329, 332-33 (E.D.
Mo. 1980) (court required plaintiff asserting causal link between asbestos and cancer
to prove harmfulness).
In the DES litigation, the link between DES and clear cell adenocarcinoma is
virtually certain, although established only epidemiologically. See Herbst, Ulfelder &
Poskanzer, Adenocarcinoma of the Vagina, 284 N.E. J. Med. 878, 878 (1971); Note,
Market Share Liability: An Answer to the DES Causation Problem, 94 Harv. L. Rev.
668, 669 (1981). Vinyl chloride exposure (at high enough levels) and one form of liver
cancer have also been linked almost unequivocally through epidemiology. See Society
of the Plastics Indus., Inc. v. OSHA, 509 F.2d 1301, 1305-06 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 992 (1975).
In the case of cigarettes and lung cancer, some early decisions indicated that
epidemiologic evidence might be sufficient. See Lartigue v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co., 317 F.2d 19, 22-23 (5th Cir. 1963); Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co.,
295 F.2d 292, 294-96 (3d Cir. 1961); Scientific Proof, supra note 19, at 369-73.
Litigation about cigarettes, however, has been stifled by warning labels that pre-
clude warranty claims, and by court holdings that until the labels were put on the
packages the manufacturers could not have known about the harm cigarettes could
cause and thus could not be held liable. See W. Prosser, supra note 11, § 99, at 660 &
nn.82-83; Scientific Proof, supra note 19, at 369-73.
57. See, e.g., Estep, Radiation Injuries and Statistics: The Need for A New
Approach to Injury Litigation, 59 Mich. L. Rev. 259, 273-80 (1960); Forgotson,
Liability For Long-Term Latent Effects of Toxic Agents, 50 A.B.A.J. 142, 142
(1964); Hall & Silbergeld, supra note 5, at 442-43; Henderson, Medical Causation in
Products Liability Disease Litigation, Trial, June 1981, at 53, 55-57; Mobilia &
Rossignol, The Role of Epidemiology in Determining Causation in Toxic Shock
Syndrome, Jurimetrics J., Fall 1983, at 78, 82-86; Riley, Toxic Shock Syndrome:
Proving Causation Before Science Has, 6 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 15, 19 (1982); Rosen-
berg, supra note 5, at 856-57, 869-74; Seltzer, Personal Injury Hazardous Waste
Litigation: A Proposalfor Tort Reform, 10 B.C. Envtl. Affairs L. Rev. 797, 815-21,
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and a few courts have acknowledged the need to infer causation from
comparisons between populations.58 To date, however, neither com-
mentators nor courts have provided guidance on how to mesh law and
epidemiology in a consistent way.
A series of New York cases exemplifies both current developments
and current confusion. In Miller v. National Cabinet Co.,5 9 the New
York Court of Appeals reversed an award of workers' compensation
846-49 (1982-1983); Tort Actions for Cancer, supra note 5, at 857. But see Dickson,
Medical Causation by Statistics, 17 Forum 792, 799-808 (1983) (noting shortcomings
in the use of epidemiologic evidence); Dore, A Commentary on the Use of Epidemio-
logical Evidence in Demonstrating Cause-in-Fact, 7 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 429, 431
(1983) ("Because of the confusing and complex nature of epidemiologic evidence,
courts should .. . [limit] the use of such evidence as proof of causation .... ).
The proponents of epidemiology give little guidance on how courts should use it,
and except for Forgotson, none address the idea of requiring epidemiologic evidence.
A number of commentators seem to have the impression that courts tend not to
accept epidemiologic evidence. See, e.g., Rosenberg, supra note 5, at 857-58, 869-74;
Seltzer, supra, at 821-24; Tort Actions for Cancer, supra note 5, at 848; see also
Trauberman, supra note 3, at 198 (author knows of no case in which an award has
been based solely on epidemiologic evidence). Research, however, reveals no case in
which a court has held against a plaintiff who has produced evidence sufficient to
satisfy the standard proposed in this Article. A large part of the problem is that
without a substantive standard, plaintiffs do not know how to present their cases. Cf.
Schaefer v. Texas Employer's Ins. Ass'n, 612 S.W.2d 199, 205 (Tex. 1980) (plaintiff
lost appeal because he failed to produce tests or data).
58. Traces of epidemiologic reasoning have appeared in a variety of cases. See,
e.g., Mahoney v. United States, 220 F. Supp. 823, 838 (E.D. Tenn. 1963) (court
found for the defendant because there was only a 1 in 24 chance that the plaintiff's
leukemia had been caused by radiation), aff'd, 339 F.2d 605 (6th Cir. 1964); Braden
v. City of Hialeah, 177 So. 2d 235, 236 (Fla. 1965) (per curiam) (plaintiff's claim
rejected because she did not show that workplace exposure to sun made probability of
contracting skin cancer greater than that of persons with normal exposure to sun);
Miller v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 398 S.W.2d 472, 472-73 (Ky. 1965) (plain-
tiffs claim rejected because physician's theory of chemical causation of leukemia
contradicted by statistical data showing that the incidence of leukemia increased
when presence in atmosphere of chemical compounds decreased); Miller v. National
Cabinet Co., 8 N.Y.2d 277, 283-84, 168 N.E.2d 811, 814, 204 N.Y.S.2d 129, 133-34
(reference to need for medical statistics showing correlation betveen exposure to
benzol and incidence of leukemia), modified on other grounds, 8 N.Y.2d 1025, 170
N.E.2d 215, 206 N.Y.S.2d 796 (1960); Collins v. National Aniline Div., 8 A.D.2d
900, 901, 186 N.Y.S.2d 979, 981 (1959) (reference to comparison of incidence rates of
bladder cancer among those exposed to carcinogenic compounds and those not so
exposed); Parker v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 440 S.W.2d 43, 47-48 (Tex.
1969) (testimony admitted but held not conclusive that persons exposed to radiation
have a higher incidence rate of cancer than non-exposed persons); Ehman v. Depart-
ment of Labor & Indus., 33 Wash. 2d 584, 595, 206 P.2d 787, 797 (1949) (court held
for defendant because plaintiff could not show that but for his employment, he
would not have contracted leukemia).
59. 8 N.Y.2d 277, 168 N.E.2d 811, 204 N.Y.S.2d 129, modified on other
grounds, 8 N.Y.2d 1025, 170 N.E.2d 215, 206 N.Y.S.2d 796 (1960).
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benefits to the widow of a worker whose death from leukemia had
allegedly been caused by exposure to benzene (also known as benzol).
The plaintiff's principal expert witness testified that the incidence of
leukemia "is quite high in patients who have been exposed to benzol,"
and that "it is possible that this man's leukemia resulted from his
alleged exposure to inhalation of benzol or benzene." 60 In holding for
the defendant, the court relied principally on the possibility-probabil-
ity distinction. 61 It pointed out, however, that "[t]he only possible
basis for drawing an inference in favor of claimant ... would be
statistics indicating that in many instances leukemia follows benzol
exposure without knowing why."6 2
The allusion in Miller to the consideration of statistics as a factor in
the determination of causation represents a small step forward in toxic
tort theory. Subsequent decisions in New York, however, have not
furthered the development of this concept. Most opinions have been
couched in terms similar to the plaintiff's argument in Miller and have
failed to employ statistical data in arriving at their conclusions about
causation.6 3 In one case, decided for the plaintiff, the expert testified
only that he knew at least some of the causes of the disease in question,
and that the plaintiff had been exposed to one of them.6 4 Two experts
in another case stated, with little quantification, that people in the
plaintiff's occupation ran a high risk of developing papillary tumors.6 5
Again the plaintiff prevailed, though the facts were hardly distin-
guishable from those in Miller. In still another case, the court explic-
itly found that the statistical requirement had been met, only to be
60. Id. at 282, 168 N.E.2d at 813, 204 N.Y.S.2d at 132 (emphasis added).
61. Id. at 282-83, 168 N.E.2d at 813, 204 N.Y.S.2d at 132-33.
62. Id. at 283, 168 N.E.2d at 814, 204 N.Y.S.2d at 133. How to use statistics and
how to incorporate other information in drawing biological inferences remained
unexplained, though the decision hinted that an eleven-fold increase in the incidence
rate in an exposed population might not support a plaintiff's verdict. Id. at 285, 168
N.E.2d at 815, 204 N.Y.S.2d at 135.
63. E.g., Shannon v. Grumman Aircraft, 29 N.Y.2d 786, 787-88, 277 N.E.2d
190, 190-91, 327 N.Y.S.2d 71, 72 (1971), rev'g 35 A.D.2d 230, 315 N.Y.S.2d 172
(1970); Boney v. Gouverneur Talc Co., 77 A.D.2d 702, 702, 430 N.Y.S.2d 399, 399
(1980); Smith v. Humboldt Dye Works, 34 A.D.2d 1041, 1042, 312 N.Y.S.2d 612,
614 (1970); Benenati v. Tin Plate Lithographing Co., 29 A.D.2d 805, 806, 287
N.Y.S.2d 528, 530 (1968); Amoroso v. Tubular & Cast Prods. Mfg. Co., 17 A.D.2d
1003, 1003-04, 233 N.Y.S.2d 909, 910-11 (1962), aff'd, 13 N.Y.2d 992, 194 N.E.2d
694, 244 N.Y.S.2d 787 (1963); Hassell v. Oxford Filing Supply Co., 16 A.D.2d 534,
536, 230 N.Y.S.2d 866, 868 (1962); see, e.g., Yannon v. New York Tel. Co., 86
A.D.2d 241, 244, 450 N.Y.S.2d 893, 895 (1982); Berman v. Werman & Sons, 14
A.D.2d 631, 631, 218 N.Y.S.2d 315, 316 (1961).
64. Benenati v. Tin Plate Lithographing Co., 29 A.D.2d 805, 806, 287 N.Y.S.2d
528, 530 (1968).
65. Smith v. Humboldt Dye Works, Inc., 34 A.D.2d 1041, 1042, 312 N.Y.S.2d
612, 614 (1970).
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reversed by the court of appeals, which found "no observable or
acceptable correlation between exposure . . . and [disease]."66 The
decisions at both levels fail to indicate the standard by which statisti-
cal inference should be judged, or how biological inference should
follow from statistics.
The Miller line of cases typifies the haphazard way in which courts
have addressed the use of comparisons between exposed and unex-
posed populations to establish toxic tort causation. 67 No clear standard
has yet emerged to determine when data and analysis are legally
sufficient, or if statistical and non-statistical evidence have been prop-
erly integrated. 8 This has clouded legal analysis as well as factfind-
ing.
C. The More-Likely-Than-Not Test in Toxic Tort Cases
Courts generally have not held that a toxic tort plaintiff bears a
lesser burden of proof on the issue of harmfulness than does the
traditional tort law plaintiff.69 In fact, courts have explicitly adopted
the preponderance test in a number of cases in which the harmfulness
of a substance was at issue. In Parker v. Employers Mutual Liability
66. Shannon v. Grumman Aircraft, 29 N.Y.2d 786, 788, 277 N.E.2d 190, 191,
327 N.Y.S.2d 71, 72 (1971), rev'g 35 A.D.2d 230, 315 N.Y.S.2d 172 (1970).
67. Courts in other states have also touched upon the evidentiary use of statistical
inference in determining toxic tort causation. See, e.g., Miller v. Olin Mathieson
Chem. Corp., 398 S.W.2d 472, 473 (Ky. 1965); Schaefer v. Texas Employers' Ins.
Ass'n, 612 S.W.2d 199, 201 (Tex. 1981); Parker v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co.,
440 S.W.2d 43, 49 (Tex. 1969); Garner v. Hecla Mining Co., 19 Utah 2d 367, 370,
431 P.2d 794, 796 (1967). Garner is the most interesting case because it involved the
question how statistical evidence should mesh with non-statistical considerations, one
of the principal concerns of epidemiology. A widow appealed the denial of workers'
compensation benefits for the death of her husband, who had been a uranium miner.
The widow introduced autopsy results showing that her husband's body had con-
tained 34 times as much radioactive lead as the average non-miner's. She also
introduced data indicating a high incidence of lung cancer in uranium miners. The
court did not find this proof necessarily insufficient, but held that such evidence did
not compel an award of benefits. Id. at 370, 431 P.2d at 796. The court noted that
other factors might have caused the disease, specifically mentioning the fact that the
decedent had smoked for approximately twenty years. Id. at 371, 431 P.2d at 796-97.
68. Only in a few of the cases that grew out of the 1976 swine flu inoculation
program have courts made further progress, but the circumstances surrounding those
cases were unique. The increased risk of Guillan-Barre Syndrome (GBS) related to
swine flu shots lasted for only a few weeks. Most toxic tort risks are less reversible.
Also, because of the number of people involved in the swine flu program and the
careful monitoring of it by the Center for Disease Control, very good epidemiologic
data were available. See infra pt. IV(B)(3).
69. The plaintiff must produce "proof which leads the jury to find that the
existence of the contested fact is more probable than its nonexistence." E. Cleary,
supra note 10, § 339, at 794. See supra note 10.
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Insurance Co. ,70 for example, the plaintiff alleged that his cancer had
been caused by workplace exposure to radiation. He was unsuccessful
because he could only establish a low level of exposure, which merely
suggested the possibility of causation. The court held that "a possible
cause only becomes 'probable' when in the absence of other reasonable
causal explanations it becomes more likely than not that the injury
was a result of its action." 7 1
In McEwen v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 72 the plaintiff claimed
that her blindness had been caused by birth control pills. The Oregon
Supreme Court upheld her jury verdict, finding that the medical
testimony had at least established that the inference of causation was
"more probably correct than incorrect."' 73 Other toxic tort decisions
have been similarly based on the more-likely-than-not test,74 but ex-
cept in a few of the swine flu cases, 75 none has come close to consider-
ing either the need for epidemiologic evidence or how to analyze such
evidence to insure that legal requirements are met.
With the dramatic increase in litigation over latent effects of toxic
exposures, the failure to fit known facts into a legal context makes the
need for a substantive evidentiary standard ever more pressing. The
formulation of a test that will meet this need requires a basic under-
standing of the philosophy and methods of epidemiology. Properly
used and evaluated, epidemiologic evidence will enable courts to
adhere to both tort law and scientific principles.
II. EPIDEMIOLOGIC PRINCIPLES
The elucidation of the relationship between a disease and a factor
(e.g., a toxic substance) suspected of causing it lies within the domain
of epidemiology.76 The epidemiologist examines this relationship in
the context of populations, comparing the disease experiences of peo-
ple exposed to the factor with those not so exposed.77 Although the
epidemiologist utilizes statistical methods, the ultimate goal is to draw
a biological inference concerning the relationship of the factor to the
70. 440 S.W.2d 43 (Tex. 1969).
71. Id. at 47 (emphasis added).
72. 270 Or. 375, 528 P.2d 522 (1974).
73. Id. at 415 n.36, 528 P.2d at 541 n.36.
74. Sheptur v. Procter & Gamble Distrib. Co., 261 F.2d 221, 224 (6th Cir. 1958)
(per curiam); Coburn v. North American Refractories Co., 295 Ky. 566, 174 S.W.2d
757 (1943); Grinnell v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 274 Cal. App. 2d 424, 435, 79 Cal
Rptr. 369, 374-75 (1969).
75. See infra pt. IV(B)(3).
76. See Last, Scope and Methods of Prevention, in Maxcy-Rosenau Public Heath
and Preventive Medicine 7-8 (J. Last ed. 1980).
77. See A. Lilienfeld & D. Lilienfeld, Foundations of Epidemiology 3 (2d ed.
1980).
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disease's etiology and/or to its natural history.7 Stated more formally,
"epidemiology can be regarded as a sequence of reasoning concerned
with biological inferences derived from observations of disease occur-
rence and related phenomena in human population groups."7 9 It is an
integrative, eclectic science utilizing concepts and methods from other
disciplines, such as statistics, sociology and demography for the study
of disease in populations.
To understand epidemiologic methods and reasoning, one must
understand how epidemiology grew out of its component disciplines.
The natural philosophers of the seventeenth century initiated a
method of reasoning based on the premise that one can mathemati-
cally model a population's mortality experience.80 This work devel-
oped into the modern fields of demography, vital statistics, and subse-
quently, epidemiology.
One of the tools that these scientists developed was the life table,
known until the early 1900's as the "table of mortality.""' The first life
tables reflected only the aggregate mortality experience in a popula-
tion.82 They provided no record of individual diseases because the
concept of specific diseases had not yet crystallized. 83 Indeed, al-
78. Lilienfeld, Definitions of Epidemiology, 107 Am. J. Epidemiology 87, 89
(1978).
79. A. Lilienfeld & D. Lilienfeld, supra note 77, at 4.
80. See Lilienfeld, "The Greening of Epidemiology"- Sanitary Physicians and the
London Epidemiological Society (1830-1870), 52 Bull. Hist. of Med. 503, 504 (1979);
Lorimer, The Development of Demography, in The Study of Population 124, 127 (P.
Hauser & 0. Duncan eds. 1959).
81. See Lilienfeld & Lilienfeld, The French Influence on the Development of
Epidemiology, in Times, Places and Persons: Aspects of the History of Epidemiology
28, 28 (A. Lilienfeld ed. 1980). Figure I shows a typical life table, a tabulation of a
given population's mortality experience.
FIGURE I
A TYPICAL LIFE TABLE
Age Population at Start of Age Deaths
0-1 1,000 20
1-4 980 80
5-14 900 250
15-24 650 250
25-34 400 300
35 and over 100 100
82. J. Farren, Historical Essay on the Rise and Early Progress of the Doctrine of
Life-Contingencies in England (London 1844); J. Francis, Annals and Legends of
Life Assurance 87-97 (London 1853); see Lilienfeld & Lilienfeld, supra note 81, at
28.
83. See Temkin, Comment on Hilt's "Epidemiology and the Statistical Move-
ment," in Times, Places and Persons: Aspects of the History of Epidemiology 61 (A.
Lilienfeld ed. 1980).
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
though the notion of statistically viewing the mortality experience of a
population dates from the mid-1600's, not until the 1800's did the
concept of disease specificity emerge. This development permitted
scientists to make accurate correlations and to draw meaningful
causal inferences . 4
A. The Definition of Disease
Although concern about the exact definition of a disease began with
communicable diseases, it is of equal concern when dealing with
chronic diseases such as cancer, heart disease and stroke. The epidemi-
ologist must begin his investigation with a clear, precise definition of
the disease being studied. 5 Within the medical community, disease is
viewed as an entity characterized by at least two of the following
criteria: "a recognized etiologic agent (or agents); an identifiable
group of signs and symptoms; [and/or] consistent anatomical altera-
tions [that is, lesions or a pathologic state being present]."8' This
definition of disease does not differ markedly from that used by law-
yers: "An illness or an abnormal state having a definite pattern of
symptoms. 87 Neither statement, however, suffices for an epidemio-
logic investigation, which requires an exact definition of the disease
being studied.
The definition of a particular disease depends on its nature and
must be sufficiently precise to permit exclusion of all other diseases
from consideration. The "gold standard" definition is that of the
pathologist, as it is based on the histologic characteristics of the dis-
ease. For diseases defined by pathophysiologic changes, such as
asthma, other characteristics, such as physiologic ones, may be used.
Some diseases and syndromes, such as volvulus,88 are best defined in
terms of what is observed during surgical intervention. The internist
84. The melding of the concepts of statistics and specificity was accomplished in
Paris and London in the mid-nineteenth century by Pierre Charles Alexandre Louis
and his English students. Louis' investigations of typhus, typhoid fever and tubercu-
losis are still considered classics in both epidemiology and clinical medicine. His
insistence on accurate data remains a keystone of sound epidemiologic work. See A.
Lilienfeld & D. Lilienfeld, supra note 77, at 31 n.7. Louis and his students were
concerned with the specificity of disease, i.e., a precise definition of the disease
which excludes all other diseases from consideration. See Temkin, supra note 83, at
61.
85. A. Lilienfeld & D. Lilienfeld, supra note 77, at 134-35.
86. Stedman's Medical Dictionary 401 (23d ed. 1976).
87. Black's Law Dictionary 420 (5th ed. 1979).
88. Volvulus is one form of intestinal blockage in which the intestine twists upon
itself, thereby causing an obstruction. As the lesion in this condition is grossly visible
upon surgical entry into the abdominal cavity, the surgeon can readily ascertain the
pathology upon such intervention. Indeed, attempting to define this condition based
on its histology is nearly impossible due to the macroscopic nature of its pathology.
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seeks to relate these histologic and/or other characteristics to the clini-
cal signs and symptoms exhibited by affected patients. The patient's
disease is thereby diagnosed.
Because the epidemiologist depends on laboratory tests and those
clinical signs and symptoms noted by the clinician, he needs a measure
of the accuracy of these clinical indicators as they relate to the defini-
tion of the disease. The two most commonly used measures of the
accuracy of clinical diagnoses are "sensitivity" and "specificity. "8
"Sensitivity" is defined as the proportion of correct diagnoses as ascer-
tained by clinical signs or symptoms and/or laboratory tests of those
afflicted with the disease. The percentage of instances in which the
disease is not so diagnosed when it is in fact absent is known as
"specificity." 0
To determine the sensitivity and specificity of a particular clinical
diagnosis or laboratory test, the epidemiologist selects individuals
known to have or not to have the disease, then applies the test to these
individuals. If either sensitivity or specificity is low, the quality of the
epidemiologist's data is correspondingly diminished.
B. Determining the Relationship between Incidence of Disease and
Exposure to a Factor
Once the epidemiologist has defined the disease of interest, he seeks
to compare the rate of disease development (incidence rate) among
89. A. Lilienfeld & D. Lilienfeld, supra note 77, at 150.
90. The following figure illustrates these concepts:
FIGURE 2
INDICES TO EVALUATE THE ACCURACY OF A TEST OR DIAGNOSTIC
EXAMINATION: SENSITIVITY AND SPECIFICITY
Test or Examination Disease Present Disease Absent
Positive A B
(Indicating disease is (true positives) (false positives)
probably present)
Negative C D
(Indicating disease is (false negatives) (true negatives)
probably absent)
Totals A + C B + D
Sensitivity is defined as the percent of those who have the disease, and are so
indicated by the test. Thus,
Sensitivity (in percent) = A x 100
A+C
Specificity is defined as the percent of those who do not have the disease and are
so indicated by the test. Thus,
Specificity (in percent) = D x 100
B+D
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
those exposed to the factor of interest with the rate among those not so
exposed. The incidence rate is a measure of the probability that an
individual will develop the disease. Hence, the epidemiologist is inter-
ested in determining if exposure to the factor changes the probability
that an individual will develop the disease."' If there is a gradation in
the degree of exposure, the possibility of a corresponding gradation in
incidence rates exists and merits investigation. The two principal
approaches to collecting and analyzing morbidity/mortality data for
exposed and non-exposed individuals are the demographic study and
the epidemiologic study. In the former, the subjects within the two
groups are viewed in the aggregate, while in the latter the subjects are
viewed individually.92 The results of demographic studies are used to
generate etiologic hypotheses, which are then tested through epidemi-
ologic studies.
1. The Demographic Study
Demographic studies explore either morbidity, if the investigator
seeks to explain sickness, or mortality, if the investigator seeks to
explain death. In either case, a study initially seeks to determine the
accuracy and completeness of the statistics being analyzed and then
attempts to ascertain how such statistics are related to possible etio-
logic factors, such as age, sex, cigarette consumption or asbestos expo-
sure. One might, for example, examine the relationship between an-
nual asbestos use in the United States from 1910-1950 and the annual
mortality rates for mesothelioma in the United States from 1940-1980.
Before drawing conclusions from the relationship between asbestos
exposure and mesothelioma, however, the epidemiologist must deter-
mine the accuracy of the available mortality and exposure data in
order to ensure that there has not been under- or over-reporting of
either asbestos use or mesothelioma mortality. Studies have indicated
that such data are available and accurate and that there is a positive
relationship between asbestos use and mortality from mesothelioma.9 3
Although such a positive correlation is supportive of a possible causal
relationship between the two, it is by no means conclusive.9 4
No matter how compelling the findings in a demographic study, it
must be recognized that such observations refer to groups and not to
the individuals within the groups. A correlation may exist between a
91. See A. Lilienfeld & D. Lifienfeld, supra note 77, at 14, 191.
92. See id. at vii, 191-94.
93. National Cancer Institute, National Institute of Environmental Health Sci-
ences & National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, Estimates of the
Fraction of Cancer in the United States Related to Occupational Factors 8-11 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Occupational Factors].
94. See Goodman, Ecological Regressions and Behavior of Individuals, 18 Am.
Soc. Rev. 663, 663 (1953); Robinson, Ecological Correlations and the Behavior of
Individuals, 15 Am. Soc. Rev. 351, 351-52, 357 (1950).
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factor and the incidence of a disease even though no causal relation-
ship exists. The classic example of this phenomenon is the linear
relationship between pig iron production in the United States and the
birth rate in Great Britain.95 Clearly, such an association is spurious.
This problem is known as an "ecological fallacy," and it imposes an
inherent limitation on the use of demographic studies in inferring a
causal relationship between a factor and a disease. 96 Demographic
studies are used mainly to focus attention on a possible association
between a factor and a disease, the elucidation of which requires
further, more refined modes of study. In order to demonstrate the
association in terms of the individual members of a group, the investi-
gator utilizes the epidemiologic study.97
2. The Epidemiologic Study
The epidemiologic study attempts to explore and clarify a possible
association between a factor and a disease within individuals in a
population. For epidemiologists, it represents the application of the
scientific method to human populations. In the scientific method, the
investigator observes the effect of a single modification in the environ-
ment of one of two otherwise identical animals. Similarly, in an
epidemiologic study, one seeks to observe the effect of exposure to a
single factor upon the incidence of disease in two otherwise identical
populations.
There are two major types of epidemiologic studies: experimental
and observational.9 In experimental studies, the epidemiologist as-
signs the exposure status to individuals. If the assignment is not per-
formed randomly, it is termed a "community trial." The use of fluori-
95. C. Snedocor & W. Cochran, Statistical Methods 189 (6th ed. 1967).
96. See A. Lilienfeld & D. Lilienfeld, supra note 77, at 14.
97. See id. at 191.
98. See id. at 191-94. Figure 3 depicts the difference between the experimental
and the observational study.
FIGURE 3
THE ANATOMY OF THE EPIDEMIOLOGIC STUDY
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dation in water to prevent dental caries was tested in this way.99 If the
epidemiologist randomly assigns individuals to exposed and non-ex-
posed groups, the study is a "clinical trial." The purpose of the ran-
domization is to ensure that the only difference between the two
groups is in the exposure; and that in all other respects, the groups are
comparable. 100 Almost every new drug authorized for use by the Food
and Drug Administration has been tested by such a clinical trial.
While clinical trials are definitive studies,' 0 ' they are not commonly
encountered in toxic tort litigation because it is seldom possible to
experiment by assigning individuals to an exposure.
The assignment of exposure, and thus an experimental study, is
feasible only when it is ethical. It would be unethical, for instance, to
assign individuals to exposure to cigarette smoking. The observational
(non-experimental) study is uniquely suited to investigating situations
in which controlled assignment is either unethical or difficult to
achieve. In observational studies, the epidemiologist systematically
observes the disease experience of individuals whose exposure status
has been determined by themselves or by others in a nonrandomized
manner. One might, for example, be interested in determining the
difference in lung cancer incidence between smokers and non-smok-
ers. If the epidemiologist views the population in terms of the individ-
uals' exposure, the study type is "prospective." The investigator first
determines if the individuals are cigarette smokers, then follows them
over a sufficient number of years to see if their lung cancer incidence
rate differs from that of non-smokers. If the epidemiologist views the
populations in terms of individual disease status, the study is either
"retrospective" or "cross-sectional." Retrospective studies focus on
past exposure while cross-sectional studies consider current exposure.
The investigator selects individuals who have or do not have lung
cancer and then determines whether or not they are or have been
cigarette smokers.
a. Prospective Studies
The prospective study is a powerful way to investigate the relation-
ship between a factor and a disease because it closely approximates the
classical scientific method. The investigator identifies two populations
(or representative samples thereof), one composed of individuals who
have been exposed to the factor and one of individuals who have not
been so exposed. 10 2 Ideally, these populations will be otherwise identi-
99. See id. at 5-6.
100. See id. at 257.
101. See id. at 256-57; D. Schwartz, R. Flemant & J. Lellouch, Clinical Trials
(M. Healy trans. 1980).
102. A. Lilienfeld & D. Lilienfeld, supra note 77, at 226; see J. Schlesselman,
Case-Control Studies 14-15 (1982).
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cal. 103 The investigator follows these populations for a period of time
(possibly many years), observing the incidence rates of disease in each
population. If the two groups are comparable, any difference in
disease incidence can then be related either to the factor or to the
sampling process, that is, to chance. Several statistical methods are
available for assessing whether a difference in incidence rates results
from sampling rather than from exposure to the factor. 104 After elimi-
nating chance and determining that a statistically significant relation-
ship between the disease and the factor exists, the epidemiologist's
next task is to estimate the magnitude of the association. The accepted
means of measuring such an association is the calculation of the
103. If the two groups are not in fact comparable, statistical methods have been
developed for adjusting the relative risk to account for the differences between them.
J. Fleiss, Statistical Methods for Rates and Proportions 237-55 (2d ed. 1981); see
Cochran, Some Methods for Strengthening the Common X2 Tests, 10 Biometrics 417
(1954); Mantel & Haenszel, Statistical Aspects of the Analysis of Data From Retro-
spective Studies of Disease, 22 J. Nat'l Cancer Inst. 719, 730 (1959).
104. See P. Armitage, Statistical Methods in Medical Research (1971); J. Fleiss,
supra note 103. In both books, every chapter relates in some way to how statistical
studies should be performed, but of particular interest on the question of sampling
are chapters 3 and 4 in Fleiss and chapter 6 in Armitage.
The importance of statistical significance testing is that it enables the investigator
to determine if the difference observed between two samples represents a true differ-
ence between the populations or if it is instead the result of the sampling process. See
D. Barnes, Statistics as Proof-Fundamentals of Quantitative Evidence 143-45
(1983). See generally I. Hacking, Logic of Statistical Inference (1965).
The investigator will usually state the hypothesis that there is no actual difference
as the "null hypothesis." For example, in a study examining the mortality of cigarette
smokers compared to that of non-smokers, the null hypothesis (Ho) would be that the
mortality rates for both groups are the same, and thus that cigarette smoking has no
impact on mortality (the status quo). Alternatively, the null hypothesis can be viewed
as the statement that the investigator is seeking to disprove. In either case, the
conjugate of H. is H, (also termed H.). The statistical significance test provides the
probability that the observed difference is due to chance if H. is, in fact, true. If that
probability is sufficiently small (5% being the most-commonly used level), then the
investigator "iejects" H., concludes that its conjugate, H,, is true, and completes his
investigation using H, as an established fact. (This analysis is sometimes done using
confidence intervals, which are fully equivalent to significance tests.)
It should be noted that with a sufficient number of observations from each popula-
tion, a statistically significant result will be observed for even very small differences,
which may represent little or no biological difference. It should also be noted that the
statistical significance test does not have anything to do with the evaluation of the
remainder of the investigation. The determination of the probability of the observed
events being attributable to random events, that is, secondary to the sampling
process, does not in fact assign a probability level to the results of the investigation
being "correct." Once the investigator has determined that the differences he has
observed are not in fact the result of random chance, he has made his inference as far
as the statistical significance tests are concerned, and he then goes on to complete the
remainder of his investigation, including the determination of biological inferences,
without recourse to the probability figure that he derived in conducting the statistical
significance test.
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relative risk, which is the ratio of the incidence rate of disease in the
exposed group divided by that rate in the non-exposed "control"
group. 105 If there is no association between the factor and the disease,
the relative risk is 1.0; that is, the incidence rates for the exposed and
non-exposed groups are equal.
The greater the magnitude of the observed relative risk, the
stronger the association between the factor and the disease. If the
factor were the only cause of the disease, the relative risk would be
infinite because the incidence of disease in the unexposed group would
be zero. Because most diseases have multi-factorial etiologies, how-
ever, it is rare to observe a relative risk greater than 10. When a
relative risk of 10 or more is observed, one can be reasonably certain
that it represents a causal relationship. For example, the relative risk
for mesothelioma from asbestos exposure, which is widely recognized
as causal, is between 50 and 80.106 By comparison, the relative risk for
leukemia in children who have been irradiated in utero is only 1.6
times that of children who were not so irradiated. 107 This represents a
relatively small increase in the risk of developing leukemia for the
irradiated children, which reflects a relatively weak causal relation-
ship.
105. See J. Fleiss, supra note 103, at 64-65; A. Lilienfeld & D. Lilienfeld, supra
note 77, at 209; Cornfield, A Method of Estimating Comparative Rates from Clinical
Data: Applications to Cancer of the Lung, Breast and Cervix, 11 J. Nat'l Cancer Inst.
1269, 1269 (1951); Mantel & Haenszel, supra note 103, at 730. See Figure 4.
FIGURE 4
EXAMPLE OF COMPUTATION OF RELATIVE RISK
1. Groups A and B are assumed identical except for exposure to
Factor F. (If not identical, there are methods of adjustment that
still allow valid comparisons).
2. Incidence of disease D in Group A (exposed to Factor F) is 50 per
100,000 population. Incidence of the disease in Group B (not
exposed) is 5 per 100,000.
3. Relative risk (r) of exposed to non-exposed is 50/5 = 10.0.
106. Love, Biological Aspects of Associations Between Environmental Exposures
and Cancer, 37 Am. Statistician 413, 417 (1983).
107. Lilienfeld, Epidemiology of Infectious and Non-Infectious Disease: Some
Comparisons, 97 Am. J. Epidemiology 135, 141 table 3 (1973). It should be noted
that this relative risk was estimated from data collected in a retrospective study. It is
presented as an illustration of the importance of the magnitude of the relative risk in
making epidemiologic/biological inferences.
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The prospective study, although very reliable, is difficult and ex-
pensive to conduct. It is not always possible to identify populations
that are exposed and not exposed to a factor. Frequently, the epidemi-
ologist is unable to follow the two groups for the period of time
required. Hence, epidemiologists have developed and extensively used
the retrospective study.
b. Retrospective Studies
Whereas a prospective study investigates the disease experience of
exposed and non-exposed groups, the epidemiologist performing a
retrospective study begins with individuals who already have (cases)
or do not have (controls) the disease under investigation. 10 8 He then
determines whether or not each individual has a past exposure to the
factor, presumably prior to the onset of the pathologic process result-
ing in the disease. Cases are usually ascertained in a hospital setting.
Control groups are commonly selected in several different ways, in-
cluding: (1) "hospital controls," in which hospital patients who are
not cases, but have different diseases, serve as controls; 0 9 (2) "popula-
tion" or "neighborhood controls," in which a random sample of the
case's neighbors or other similar groups constitutes the controls;" 0 and
(3) "matched population" or "matched neighborhood controls," in
which population or neighborhood controls are matched to the cases
so that various factors known or suspected to be unrelated to the
disease are similarly distributed in the case and the control popula-
tions."' The retrospective study is inherently limited because one
cannot directly ascertain disease incidence rates among the exposed
and non-exposed groups; hence, the relative risk cannot be calculated
directly." 2 There is, however, a statistic known as the "odds ratio""l 3
that approximates the relative risk in those instances in which the
disease incidence rate in the non-exposed population is low. As the
odds ratio increases, so does the relative risk.
Retrospective studies in which hospital controls are used, unlike
prospective studies, may be subject to a major bias in the selection of
the controls, known as a "Berksonian bias.""l 4 The bias results from
108. A. Lilienfeld & D. Lilienfeld, supra note 77, at 194; see The Case Control
Study: Consensus and Controversy, 32 J. Chronic Diseases 1 (1979).
109. See A. Lflienfeld & D. Lilienfeld, supra note 77, at 196-97 & table 8-4.
110. See id. at 197 table 8-4.
111. See id. at 197-98 & table 8-4.
112. Cornfield, supra note 105, at 1269.
113. See Fleiss, Confidence Intervals for the Odds Ratio in Case-Control Studies:
The State of the Art, 32 J. Chronic Diseases 69 (1979).
114. A. Lilienfeld & D. Lilienfeld, supra note 77, at 202; see Berkson, Limitations
of the Application of Fourfold Table Analysis to Hospital Data, 2 Biometrics 47, 49-
51 (1946).
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the differing probabilities of admission into the hospital for cases and
hospital controls. If the probabilities of admission for each of these
two groups are equivalent, there is no Berksonian bias."" The maxi-
mum increase in the observed odds ratio that a Berksonian bias usu-
ally produces in the absence of any relationship between a factor and
a disease is approximately three." 6 Hence, if an odds ratio is observed
to be greater than three, it is unlikely to have resulted entirely from
the operation of a Berksonian bias.
c. Cross-Sectional Studies
Epidemiologic studies usually are concerned with relating anteced-
ent exposure with subsequent disease occurrence. There are, however,
occasions when the epidemiologist is interested in determining the
relationship between current exposure and current disease status. This
association can be elucidated by the cross-sectional study."l 7 However,
as diseases involved in toxic tort litigation generally have significant
latency periods, cross-sectional studies are usually of little use in deter-
mining causation.
d. Attributable Risk
Observational studies are all directed at determining the relative
risk of developing a disease that is associated with exposure to a factor.
The relative risk, however, expresses only the magnitude of that asso-
ciation." 8 The statistical measure of a factor's relationship to a disease
in the population is the "attributable risk.""' 9 It was originally de-
scribed as the percentage decline in the population's disease incidence
that would occur if the population's exposure to the factor were
eliminated.12 0 For example, the risk of lung cancer attributable to
smoking in the United States today is approximately eighty percent. In
other words, if smoking were eliminated in the United States, the
incidence of lung cancer would decline by about eighty percent.12 '
115. See A. Lilienfeld & D. Lilienfeld, supra note 77, at 199-202.
116. Lilienfeld, The Maximum Relative Risk Produced by a Berksonian Bias
(unpublished manuscript 1983) (available in files of Fordham Law Review). See A.
Lilienfeld & D. Lilienfeld, supra note 77, at 201-02.
117. A cross-sectional study is identical to a retrospective one except that the
investigator is concerned with current exposure status. Therefore, it shares the retro-
spective study's limitation in estimating relative risks.
118. A. Lilienfeld & D. Lilienfeld, supra note 77, at 217-18, 302.
119. Id. at 217.
120. Walter, Calculation of Attributable Risks from Epidemiological Data, 7 Int'l
J. Epidemiology 175, 175 (1978); see Levin, The Occurrence of Lung Cancer in Man,
9 Acta Unio Internationala Contra Cancrum 531, 536 (1953).
121. A. Lilienfeld, Foundations of Epidemiology 256 (1st ed. 1976).
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Alternatively, the attributable risk may be viewed as representing
the proportion of the disease that is statistically attributable to the
factor. 122 Using the example of lung cancer and cigarette smoking, one
could say that cigarette smoking accounts for approximately eighty
percent of the incidence of lung cancer in the United States. The
attributable risk, therefore, is a composite measure that takes into
account both the relative risk of disease if exposed and the proportion
in the population so exposed. 12 3 It is an essential tool in examining the
sufficiency of epidemiologic evidence.
122. Walter, The Distribution of Levin's Measure of Attributable Risk, 62 Biome-
trika 371, 371 (1975).
123. From the equation in Figure 5, it can be seen that for the attributable risk to
be high for a given factor (i.e., greater than 0.5), both the relative risk (r) and the
proportion in the population so exposed (b) must be relatively large.
FIGURE 5
CALCULATION OF ATTRIBUTABLE RISK
Attributable Risk = b (r - 1)
b (r - 1) + 1
b = proportion of total population exposed to factor
r = relative risk
The table in Figure 6 shows how attributable risk varies within these parameters.
If an investigator restricts the definition of exposure, thereby increasing the relative
risk, the proportion of exposed people in the population would be lower and the
attributable risk would remain approximately the same.
FIGURE 6
ATTRIBUTABLE RISKS AS A PROPORTION FOR
SELECTED VALUES OF RELATIVE RISK AND
PROPORTION OF POPULATION WITH THE
CHARACTERISTIC*
b - Proportion of Population r = Relative Risk
with Characteristic
(percent) 2 4 10 12
10 .09 .23 .47 .52
30 .23 .47 .73 .77
50 .33 .60 .82 .84
70 .41 .67 .86 .89
90 .47 .73 .89 .91
95 .49 .74 .90 .92
*Attributable Risk = b (r - 1)
b (r - 1) + 1
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C. Biological Inferences from Epidemiologic Data
Demographic and epidemiologic studies both facilitate the elucida-
tion of the statistical association between a factor and a disease. In
order to draw the biological inference that a causal relationship exists,
however, the epidemiologist must integrate additional scientific infor-
mation. The derivation of such an inference requires rigorous consid-
eration of laboratory, experimental, demographic and epidemiologic
data. 124
A causal inference must be biologically plausible and must conform
to generally accepted theories. With the advent of the germ theory,
criteria for determining whether a given bacteria caused a disease
became necessary. Thus the Henle-Koch Postulates, developed in the
nineteenth century, permitted the inference that a given species of
bacteria, such as Vibrio cholera, is the etiologic agent of a given
disease, such as Asiatic cholera. These postulates were:
1. The organism must be found in all cases of the disease in ques-
tion.
2. It must be isolated from patients with the disease and grown in
pure culture.
3. When the pure culture is inoculated into susceptible animals or
man, it must reproduce the disease. 125
The success of epidemiology in elucidating the relationship between
non-bacterial causes of disease in the 1930's to the 1950's necessitated
extension of the Henle-Koch Postulates in order to to derive biological
inferences about the relationship between a factor and a disease. 12
Much of the initial work on these modifications was conducted with a
view to establishing the relationship between cigarette smoking and
lung cancer. As the breadth of epidemiology expanded, these ideas
were generalized. They have been stated formally by Evans12 7 and are
124. It should be noted that it is possible to have an inadequately developed
biological inference regarding the relationship between a factor and a disease, yet
still have a statistically plausible relationship. See A. Lilienfeld & D. Lilienfeld,
supra note 77, at 315-16. The necessary biological knowledge may not be available at
the time that the statistical association is found. An example of this occurrence is the
relationship between oral contraceptives and various circulatory diseases. Id. at 315-
16. When an association was discovered, there was no laboratory evidence to support
a causal inference. However, the statistical association provided direction for labora-
tory workers in their research. The resulting laboratory data provided the necessary
biological facts for the causal relationship to be stated. Id. at 316.
125. Id. at 292.
126. For the purposes of this Article, the following definition of a causal relation-
ship will be used: "A causal relationship would be recognized to exist whenever
evidence indicates that the factors form part of the complex of circumstances that
increases the probability of the occurrence of disease and that a diminution of one or
more of these factors decreases the frequency of that disease." Id. at 295.
127. Evans, Causation and Disease: The Henle-Koch Postulates Revisited, 49 Yale
J. Biology & Med. 175 (1976).
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now known as the Henle-Koch-Evans Postulates. Widely accepted by
epidemiologists as the valid criteria for arriving at biological etiologi-
cal inferences,'2 8 the postulates are:
1. The prevalence rate of the disease should be significantly higher
in those exposed to the hypothesized cause than in controls not so
exposed (the cause may be present in the external environment or as a
defect in host responses).
2. Exposure to the hypothesized cause should be more frequent
among those with the disease than in controls without the disease
when all other risk factors are held constant.
3. Incidence of the disease should be significantly higher in those
exposed to the cause than in those not so exposed, as shown by
prospective studies.
4. Temporally, the disease should follow exposure to the hypothe-
sized causative agent with the distribution of incubation periods on a
log-normal-shaped curve.
5. A spectrum of host responses should follow exposure to the
hypothesized agent along a logical biologic gradient from mild to
severe.
6. A measurable host response following exposure to the hypothe-
sized cause should have a high probability of appearing in those
lacking this response before exposure (e.g., antibody, cancer cells) or
should increase in magnitude if present before exposure; this response
pattern should occur infrequently in persons not so exposed.
7. Experimental reproduction of the disease should occur more
frequently in animals or man appropriately exposed to the hypothe-
sized cause than in those not so exposed; this exposure may be deliber-
ate in volunteers, experimentally induced in the laboratory, or dem-
onstrated in a controlled regulation of natural exposure.
8. Elimination or modification of the hypothesized cause or of the
vector carrying it should decrease the incidence of the disease (e.g.,
control of polluted water, removal of tar from cigarettes).
9. Prevention or modification of the host's response on exposure to
the hypothesized cause should decrease or eliminate the disease (e.g.,
immunization, drugs to lower cholesterol, specific lymphocyte trans-
fer factor in cancer).
10. All of the relationships and findings should make biological and
epidemiologic sense.'29
128. A. Lilienfeld & D. Lilienfeld, supra note 77, at 317-18.
129. Id. The first three postulates embody the same concept, that is, that the
incidence of disease should be greater in those exposed than in those not exposed for
cross-sectional, retrospective and prospective studies. Postulate 4 refers to the epi-
demic curve, an epidemiologic concept originally developed for infectious diseases
that is also applicable to such chronic diseases as cancer. See A. Lilienfeld & D.
Lilienfeld, supra note 77, at 54-56. Postulates 5 and 6 relate to "host responses,"
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Satisfaction of these criteria enables the epidemiologist to move
beyond a correlation to form a biological inference that is applicable
to all contemporary situations. The importance of the last criterion of
the Henle-Koch-Evans Postulates cannot be over-emphasized because
only its satisfaction can translate statements of statistical associations
into inferences understandable within a biological context (concerning
a pathophysiological process with a defined cause).
The approach to epidemiologic problems described above is a gen-
erally accepted one. Although specific aspects of that approach, such
as the extensions made by Evans to the Henle-Koch Postulates, have
changed over time, the basic framework of reasoning has remained
essentially unaltered since its inception in the nineteenth century. The
major change over the past 150 years has not been in the epidemio-
logic approach to disease problems per se, but rather in the precision
and refinement of the methods used to make biological inferences. 130
III. AN EVIDENTIARY STANDARD COMBINING THE MORE-LIKELY-THAN-
NOT TEST AND EPIDEMIOLOGY
A. Requirement that Plaintiff Prove that Allegations of Causation Are
More-Likely-Than-Not True
Basic to this Article is the premise that a toxic tort plaintiff bears the
burden of proving causation by a preponderance of the evidence.131
The plaintiff is regarded as the legal aggressor, the one who wants the
court to change the present state of affairs.132 Thus "policy consider-
which include such phenomena as fevers, increases in the levels of antibodies to a
bacteria or virus, or increases in the number of white cells.
130. Lilienfeld & Lilienfeld, A Century of Case-Control Studies: Progress?, 32 J.
Chronic Diseases 5, 13 (1979).
131. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. The burden of proof encompasses
the burden of producing evidence and the burden of persuasion. The former imposes
on a party the obligaton to present evidence theoretically sufficient to sustain his
version of the facts at issue; the latter determines which side loses if the factfinder is
not sufficiently convinced at the end of the trial. E. Cleary, supra note 10, § 336, at
783-84; see Belton, Burdens of Pleading and Proof in Discrimination Cases: Toward
a Theory of Procedural Justice, 34 Vand. L. Rev. 1205, 1213 (1981). See supra note
10. This Article focuses on the production rather than the persuasion aspect of the
burden of proof; its concern is the sufficiency of evidence. The two burdens are
conceptually linked, however, because a decision as to whether a party has satisfied
the production burden cannot be made without considering the degree of certainty
required to meet the persuasion burden. See infra pt. IV(B) for a discussion of why
the more-likely-than-not test results in the appropriate degree of certainty.
132. Louisell, Construing Rule 301: Instructing the Jury on Presumptions in Civil
Actions and Proceedings, 63 Va. L. Rev. 281, 285 (1977); see Belton, supra note 131,
at 1213; Cleary, Presuming and Pleading: An Essay on Juristic Immaturity, 12 Stan.
L. Rev. 5, 7 (1959).
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ations of fairness suggest that [he] should be required to prove his
claim to relief.' '1 33 While there have been exceptions to this general
rule in cases not involving toxic torts, 134 the principles on which the
exceptions have been based do not indicate that toxic tort defendants
should bear the "burden of disproof' when toxic tort plaintiffs cannot
produce sufficient evidence of causation.
Commentators usually discuss reversal of the burden of proof in the
context of presumptions, which are created for reasons of policy,
fairness and convenience. 135 Judicial analysis, however, usually re-
duces to evaluation of probabilities and consideration of which party
has superior access to proof.13 Neither of these factors weigh against
the typical toxic tort defendant. Consider the presumption that a
driver acts in the course of his employment when he drives a vehicle
that is owned by his employer. "Although it is known that employees
The similarity between civil procedure and the scientific method in dealing with
those who seek to change the status quo is also instructive. Both law and science do,
after all, strive to determine as nearly as possible what "really" occurs or has oc-
curred, and both have developed means for making decisions in the face of uncer-
tainty. It is interesting that science, like the law, generally insists that a new finding
be well-established by evidence before it is accepted as part of the body of scientific
knowledge.
133. Belton, supra note 131, at 1213.
134. See, e.g., Wells v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 107 Ga. App. 826, 831-32, 131
S.E.2d 634, 638 (1963) (presumption in contract case in plaintiff's favor that her
pregnancy extended nine full months); Johnson v. Secretary of State, 406 Mich. 420,
440-42, 280 N.W.2d 9, 14-15 (1979) (presumption of negligence stemming from
automobile driver's flight from accident in violation of statute).
135. See Belton, supra note 131, at 1217; Cleary, supra note 132, at 11; James,
Burdens of Proof, 47 Va. L. Rev. 51, 65 (1961); Louisell, supra note 132, at 292-93.
But cf. Laughlin, In Support of the Thayer Theory of Presumptions, 52 Mich. L.
Rev. 195, 219 (1953) (balance of probabilities should be used to determine whether
plaintiffs burden has been fulfilled). One relatively recent case listed eleven factors
to be considered in allocating the burden of proof. Nelson v. Hughes, 290 Or. 653,
658-59, 625 P.2d 643, 645-46 (1981).
Commentators have disagreed about whether presumptions operate to shift both
the burden of persuasion and the burden of production, or only the latter. See Allen,
Presumptions in Civil Actions Reconsidered, 66 Iowa L. Rev. 843, 862-67 (1981)
(mechanical use of presumptions should be discarded); Hecht & Pinzler, Rebutting
Presumptions: Order Out of Chaos, 58 B.U.L. Rev. 527, 547-58 (1978) (distinguish-
ing three situations in which presumptions arise); Ladd, Presumptions in Civil
Actions, 1977 Ariz. St. L.J. 275, 283-88 (questioning whether all presumptions
should be treated alike). Compare Laughlin, supra, at 209-12 (only production
burden should be shifted), with Morgan, Presumptions, 12 Wash. L. Rev. 255, 281
(1937) (both burdens should be shifted).
136. James, supra note 135, at 66; see International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324, 359 n.45 (1977) ("Presumptions shifting the burden of proof are
often created to reflect judicial evaluations of probabilities and to conform with a
party's superior access to the proof."). But see Dworkin, supra note 10, at 1161
(policy and fairness are determinative); Laughlin, supra note 135, at 219 (only
presumptions based on probability are necessary).
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sometimes use their employers' vehicles for purely private
missions . . . that would constitute a distinct minority of cases.'
' 37
Similarly, because services rendered in the context of a business rela-
tionship are not often performed gratuitously, a defendant denying an
obligation to pay for such services would have the burden of proving
that the obligation did not exist. 138 Such a common sense analysis of
what is probable does not support making an exception to the general
rule on proof of causation in toxic tort cases. Most diseases, including
cancer, do not usually result from tortious conduct, or from exposure
to identifiable man-made substances. 39
Courts have also justified shifting the burden of proof because a
defendant has superior access to evidence, but only under unusual
circumstances such as when goods are damaged in a bailee's posses-
sion. 140 Such circumstances do not exist in most toxic tort cases because
the problem encountered in determining causation is not the inaccessi-
bility of evidence, but rather its non-existence or insufficiency. Epide-
miologic analysis, the proper basis for recovery, can be performed by
either plaintiffs or defendants.1 4' A defendant may already possess the
necessary records or data for an epidemiologic study, but given suffi-
cient grounds for initiating a suit and a sufficient showing of rele-
vance, discovery rules would make these available to the plaintiff.
Thus, neither access to evidence nor probability warrants shifting the
burden of proof to defendants in toxic tort cakes. Toxic tort plaintiffs
should be held to the same requirements as plaintiffs in most other tort
actions. They should be required to produce evidence sufficient to
establish that the substance at issue more likely than not caused the
injury or disease in question. 4 2
137. Laughlin, supra note 135, at 215.
138. E. Cleary, supra note 10, § 337, at 787.
139. See infra note 220. One court, in holding for a toxic tort defendant, has
explicitly noted the lack of such a general relationship between exposure and disease.
Miller v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 398 S.W.2d 472, 473 (Ky. 1966) (noting that
while organic chemical usage had increased, the overall incidence of leukemia, the
disease at issue, had decreased).
140. James, supra note 135, at 66.
141. The only barrier to equal accessibility might be disparity in financial capabil-
ities. No theory, however, would impose on a rich defendant the duty to develop a
case for a poor plaintiff.
142. Requiring that a plaintiff sustain the burden of proof by a preponderance of
the evidence derives from the practical objective of maximizing the number of cases
decided correctly. Unlike criminal law, which is skewed toward avoiding incorrect
guilty verdicts, tort law seeks to allocate neutrally the cost of damages or injuries. In
most cases its goal is to minimize misallocation, which is best accomplished by using
the more-likely-than-not test. See Cleary, supra note 132, at 13; Kaye, The Limits of
the Preponderance of the Evidence Standard: Justifiably Naked Statistical Evidence
and Multiple Causation, 1982 Am. B. Found. Research J. 487, 496-503. Applied to
single-factor toxic tort cases, the long-term result of this rule is the payment by
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B. The Addition of the Attributable Risk Test to the
Henle-Koch-Evans Postulates
The Henle-Koch-Evans Postulates do not, by themselves, provide a
complete legal standard because the determination of legal causation
requires consideration of the degree of certainty required to meet the
plaintiff's burden of proof. This deficiency can be remedied, however,
by requiring in addition that the attributable risk for the factor at
issue be greater than .50. Conceptually, the finder of fact must decide
whether it is more likely than not that an individual plaintiff con-
tracted a specific disease as a result of exposure to a factor for which
the defendant is legally responsible. From an epidemiologic perspec-
tive, the question has two parts: (1) is the factor causally related to the
disease (satisfaction of Henle-Koch-Evans Postulates), and (2) is the
attributable risk greater than .50? If, in an exposed population, more
than half the cases of a disease can be attributed to the exposure, and
if the postulates are satisfied, then absent other information about a
diseased individual, it is more likely than not that his or her illness was
caused by the exposure. 143
C. Practical Application of the Evidentiary Test
Consider a manufacturing plant that employs 1000 production
workers. At some work stations widget grinders emit widget dust.
Studies of people exposed to this type of dust for ten or more years at
concentrations higher than 100 dust particles per cubic centimeter
have indicated a relative risk of 2.5 (compared to non-exposed per-
defendants, taken collectively, of the total cost of the injuries they have caused to
plaintiffs, taken collectively. The rule may break down in multi-factor cases, or in
cases in which a defendant has very probably caused many, but not all, occurrences
of a given disease in a relatively large population. In the latter situation either under-
compensation or over-compensation of the plaintiffs, as a group, may result. These
issues are discussed in the context of proportional liability, infra pt. V(B).
143. In using the Henle-Koch-Evans Postulates as constrained by attributable risk,
great care must be taken in defining the exposure and the exposed population. In
some instances, the focus should be on the total exposure above a certain level; in
other cases the extent of exposure at any given time may be more important. The
population of interest should be limited to individuals exposed at or beyond the level
or extent at issue. For example, if the defined population included all steelworkers, it
would be difficult to make inferences about the effects of prolonged high exposure to
blast furnace fumes. New steelworkers and those who worked in rolling mills would
not have suffered the same level of exposure as long-time blast furnace workers. To
appreciate fully the problems that can be caused by improperly defining a popula-
tion, consider a numerical example. Suppose that 10 of 50 blast furnace workers have
a lung disease, that 100 of 1950 other steel workers have the same disease, and that 50
of 1000 non-steelworkers have it. Comparing the blast furnace workers to the general
population yields a relative risk of 4, but if all steelworkers are considered, the
relative risk drops to 1.1.
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sons) for megabonkoma, a deadly (though fictional) form of lung
cancer. If one of the widget workers contracts this terrible disease,
could he establish through an epidemiologic study that it more likely
than not resulted from widget dust exposure at the factory? Answering
this question requires determining if the study results satisfy the
Henle-Koch-Evans Postulates, and if the worker in question was ex-
posed to widget dust for a long enough period and at a high enough
concentration.
To test evidence against the Henle-Koch-Evans Postulates one must
consider a number of factors. For example, breathing dust is more
likely to cause a lung disease, such as megabonkoma, than a bone
disease. This would support the inference of a causal connection.
Studies that indicate a correlation between megabonkoma in rats and
exposure to widget dust would tend to confirm human data and
would further support the inference. Such biological information,
together with a sufficiently large population sample, an absence of
serious biases and a consistent and verified relative risk of 2.5 would
probably support the inference that widget dust causes some cases of
megabonkoma. The widget worker, however, would still have to
establish both exposure and a sufficiently high attributable risk.
If the worker in question had held his job for over ten years, and
had worked in a part of the factory where widget dust exceeded 100
particles per cubic centimeter, exposure would be quite clear, and the
attributable risk of .60 would easily satisfy the more-likely-than-not
test.' 44 For situations in which sufficient exposure is certain, any
relative risk greater than 2 would lead to an attributable risk of more
than .50.145 More typical, however, is the situation in which exposure
is questionable. Perhaps the worker performed a number of tasks at
various locations in the plant or used different machines that emitted
varying amounts of dust. Under these circumstances, one could esti-
mate the probability that exposure exceeded the level in the study. If
only sixty percent of the 1000 workers were heavily exposed, the
attributable risk would drop to .47,146 even with a relative risk of 2.5.
This evidence would fail the more-likely-than-not test and would not
support a plaintiffs verdict.
144. 1.0 (2.5 - 1) = .60
1.0 (2.5 -1) +I
See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
145. If the proportion of the populations exposed is 1.0, as in supra note 144, then:
1.0 (2+z-1) _( )
1.0 (2+z-1) + 1 (2+z)
which is greater than 0.50 for any positive z.
146. .6 (2.5-1) .47
.6 (2.5-1) + 1
Note that this example is somewhat oversimplified. It assumes that at any exposure
less than 10 years and 100 particles per cubic centimeter the relative risk is 1.0.
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A worker who contracted megabonkoma after high exposure for less
than ten years might still be able to establish causation if he could
produce evidence that the total amount of dust inhaled was an ade-
quate measure of exposure. A person exposed at a relatively low level
for more than ten years could make a similar argument. In no case,
however, can evidence suffice to establish a causal link if it does not
include at least reasonable estimates of exposure levels and durations,
and data that reasonably indicate a relative risk greater than 2.147
IV. PRECEDENTS AND REQUIREMENTS FOR THE INTRODUCTION
OF EPIDEMIOLOGIC EVIDENCE
A party seeking to introduce scientific evidence faces two general
requirements: The methods used to obtain data and to draw infer-
ences therefrom must be legally acceptable, and the witnesses through
whom the evidence is introduced must be suitably qualified. 148 Prece-
dent supports not only admitting epidemiologic proof into evidence, 149
but also requiring that such proof be produced by a toxic tort plain-
tiff. Precedent also supports a rule requiring that a medical expert be
qualified as an epidemiologist before testimony on causation is admit-
ted in a toxic tort case.
A. Precedents for Admitting Epidemiologic Proof into Evidence
In cases involving diseases caused by viruses or bacteria, courts have
generally accepted epidemiologic evidence with little difficulty, 50 and
147. The foregoing discussion leaves open many questions about the detailed
application of the Henle-Koch-Evans Postulates, and about what constitutes a rea-
sonable indication of relative risk. In actual cases, expert witnesses would probe the
many complications and subtleties that have been omitted. At least one court has
recognized that there is "room for responsible epidemiologists to differ significantly
on many of the key choices and assumptions to be made in analyzing [a] causal
relationship." O'Gara v. United States, 560 F. Supp. 786, 789 (E.D. Pa. 1983). To be
sufficient, however, the testimony of experts should fall within the proposed frame-
work.
148. See 3 J. Weinstein & P. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence §§ 702[01]-[04] (1982).
149. For an excellent bibliography and discussion of the admissibility and use of
scientific evidence, see Symposium on Science and the Rules of Evidence, 99 F.R.D.
187 (1983). See generally Gianelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence:
Frye v. United States, a Half-Century Later, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 1197, 1235-45
(1980) (discussion of the standards used to determine admissibility); Korn, Law,
Fact, and Science in the Courts, 66 Colum. L. Rev. 1080, 1108-1113 (1966) (discus-
sion of the process through which courts incorporate scientific principles and discov-
eries); McCormick, Scientific Evidence: Defining a New Approach to Admissibility,
67 Iowa L. Rev. 879, 882-83 (1982) (same).
150. See, e.g., Kehm v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 724 F.2d 613, 617-20 (8th
Cir. 1983) (toxic shock syndrome case in which court admitted into evidence epide-
miologic reports from the Center for Disease Control); Wolf v. Procter & Gamble
Co., 555 F. Supp. 613, 624-26 (D.N.J. 1982) (same); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Donovan,
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there exists no rationale for treating such evidence differently in toxic
tort cases. In fact, even in some toxic tort cases, courts have alluded to
the concept of comparing incidence rates.'15 Some commentators have
objected to this approach because the evidence is not specific to the
plaintiff, 15 2 but they ignore the fact that even " '[p]articularistic' evi-
dence offers nothing more than a basis for conclusions about a per-
ceived balance of probabilities.' 15 3 Other commentators have la-
mented that courts tend not to accept epidemiology,5 4 but the basis
for this assertion is unclear. In fact, good epidemiologic evidence is
not only accepted by courts; in at least one case, it has been re-
quired. 55
B. Precedents for Incorporation of Epidemiologic Postulates into an
Evidentiary Standard
A number of precedents amply support an evidentiary standard
incorporating scientific principles and requiring that evidence con-
form to them. Some courts have even measured evidence against the
Ewing Postulates, 56 despite serious questions about their validity in
legal proceedings and problems in applying them objectively. The
postulates of epidemiology are far better established than Ewing's,
and should be more readily used as the basis for a standard against
which to test the sufficiency of evidence. Insofar as epidemiology
involves statistics, decisions in a number of cases, not all involving
toxic torts, have demonstrated the ability of courts to judge intelli-
gently the validity of statistical inferences. 5 7
1. Discrimination Cases
In discrimination cases, which often hinge on the statistical signifi-
cance of the difference between the composition of a population and
125 F. Supp. 261, 262 (D.D.C. 1954) (tuberculosis case in which workers' compensa-
tion claimant was awarded recovery based on increased a priori risk), aff'd, 221 F.2d
886 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Sacred Heart Med. Center v. Carrado, 92 Wash. 2d 631, 637,
600 P.2d 1015, 1019 (1979) (hepatitis case in which recovery was allowed based on
plaintiffs elevated a priori risk of contracting the disease).
151. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
152. Dickson, supra note 57, at 799-808; Dore, supra note 57, at 431.
153. Rosenberg, supra note 5, at 870.
154. See supra note 57.
155. Heyman v. United States, 506 F. Supp. 1145, 1149 (S.D. Fla. 1981). See
infra notes 180-82 and accompanying text.
156. See, e.g., Stordahl v. Rush Implement Co., 148 Mont. 13, 19-20, 417 P.2d
95, 99 (1966); Sikora v. Apex Beverage Corp., 282 A.D. 193, 196, 122 N.Y.S.2d 64,
66 (1953), afJ'd, 306 N.Y. 917, 119 N.E.2d 601 (1954); Dennison v. Wing, 279 A.D.
494, 496-97, 110 N.Y.S.2d 811, 813-14 (1952).
157. See Rosenberg, supra note 5, at 870-71.
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the composition of a work force, jury panel or the like, courts have
shown great understanding of the value of testing hypotheses against
data. The Supreme Court, in two 1977 discrimination cases,15 explic-
itly approved the type of significance testing used in the statistical part
of an epidemiologic study. A third case decided that year involved
similar though less explicit reasoning. 59 Castaneda v. Partida10 dealt
with grand jury selection practices in Hidalgo County, Texas. Al-
though the population was approximately eighty percent Hispanic,
grand jury participation over a ten-year period averaged only thirty-
nine percent Spanish surnamed, with the highest annual figure just
over fifty percent. '6 The chance of such disproportionate representa-
tion was extremely low, assuming no discrimination. The Court,
therefore, rejected this null hypothesis162 and held that, absent rebut-
tal evidence, the alternative hypothesis of discrimination should be
accepted. 63 Hazelwood School District v. United States6 4 and Inter-
national Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States6 5 involved dis-
criminatory hiring practices alleged to be in violation of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.166 In Teamsters, the Court explicitly
approved the use of statistics to establish a prima facie case of discrim-
ination, but did not delve into details of methodology. 67 In Hazel-
wood, however, it endorsed the more rigorous statistical approach
used in Castaneda. 68
These and subsequent cases' 69 clearly establish the ability of courts
to understand and use classical hypothesis testing techniques. They do
not, however, address the basic issue of tort causation. A statistically
significant difference in a discrimination case shifts the burden of
158. Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977); Castaneda v.
Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977).
159. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
160. 430 U.S. 482 (1977).
161. Id. at 486-87 & n.7.
162. See id. at 494 & n.13. See supra note 104.
163. 430 U.S. at 496 n.17. The Court noted that the likelihood that random
selection would produce the jury panels actually selected in Hidalgo County was less
than 1 in 10140.
164. 433 U.S. 299 (1977).
165. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
166. Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 301; Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 328.
167. 431 U.S. at 339.
168. 433 U.S. at 308 n.14, 311 n.17.
169. See, e.g., Plemer v. Parsons-Cilbane, 713 F.2d 1127, 1137 (5th Cir. 1983);
Harris v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 712 F.2d 1377, 1383 (11th Cir. 1983); Chisholm
v. United States Postal Serv., 665 F.2d 482, 494-95 (4th Cir. 1981); EEOC v. United
Virginia Bank, 615 F.2d 147, 149-54 (4th Cir. 1980).
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proof, and absent rebuttal evidence, establishes the plaintiff's allega-
tions as facts. In a toxic tort case, the difference not only must be
statistically significant, but also must be sufficiently large to make it
more likely than not that the individual plaintiff's injury resulted from
the defendant's substance. The standard proposed in this Article
would also require consistency with the Henle-Koch-Evans Postulates.
The following example illustrates the difference between discrimi-
nation and toxic tort cases. Evidence that a company employs a
workforce that is only fifteen percent black from a population that is
twenty percent black might conclusively prove discrimination. A
twenty percent disease rate in a population exposed to a chemical,
however, would not prove tort causation in an individual case if the
unexposed population experienced a fifteen percent rate. The maxi-
mum attributable risk would be only twenty-five percent. 170 More-
over, even if the exposed population had a disease rate of forty-five
percent, and the attributable risk were as high as sixty-seven per-
cent, 71 the Henle-Koch-Evans Postulates would still have to be satis-
fied.
2. Identity Cases
Criminal law is another area in which courts have examined statis-
tical evidence. Proving the identity of a criminal often involves the use
of circumstantial evidence indicating that certain events would be
very unlikely to occur by coincidence. Attempts to quantify this mode
of proof through statistics, however, have generally foundered. The
best known example is People v. Collins,17 2 in which a white woman
and a black man in a yellow car committed an assault and robbery.
The defendants fit this description, and the prosecution introduced
evidence that the probability of these factors occurring together by
coincidence was extremely slight. The jury found the defendants
guilty, but the Supreme Court of California overturned the conviction
because the method used to compute the probability of coincidence
was flawed, and because the unlikelihood of coincidence did not
establish the probability that the accused couple was guilty.' 7 3 In a
large population, even a rare combination could be expected to occur
more than just once. Therefore, without resorting to a controversial
170. 1 (20/15-1) = .25
1 (20/15-1) + 1
See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
171. 1 (45/15-1) - .67
1 (45/15-1) + 1
See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
172. 68 Cal. 2d 319, 438 P.2d 33, 66 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1968).
173. Id. at 327-31, 438 P.2d at 38-40, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 502-05.
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technique known as Bayesian analysis, 74 one cannot directly ascribe a
probability to the hypothesis of guilt. 75
The Collins problem limits all hypothesis testing. It is because
statistics in themselves do not determine probability7 6 that the non-
statistical postulates of epidemiology are so extremely important. To
reach a scientifically sound opinion that a causal link more likely than
not exists, one must integrate other information. The overall epidemi-
ologic approach and the need for a substantive standard are both
illustrated by the swine flu cases, which constitute the best judicial use
of epidemiology to date.
3. Swine Flu Cases
In 1976, fear of an impending influenza epidemic prompted rapid
implementation of a swine flu inoculation program 177 before final
testing of the vaccine could be completed. As a result, no drug com-
pany would manufacture the vaccine until the federal government
agreed to assume all liability. 7 Thus, the swine flu cases were tried
under the Federal Tort Claims Act 179 before federal district judges and
without a jury, and many of the opinions did not reach the issue of
174. See Finkelstein & Fairley, A Bayesian Approach to Identificiation Evidence,
83 Harv. L. Rev. 489, 498-501 (1970).
175. Id. But see Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal
Process, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 1329, 1365-76 (1971) (rejecting the use of Bayesian analy-
sis).
176. For paternity cases, some courts, e.g., Cramer v. Morrison, 88 Cal. App. 3d
873, 884-85, 153 Cal. Rptr. 865, 871-72 (1979); Malvasi v. Malvasi, 167 N.J. Super.
513, 515-16, 401 A.2d 279, 280 (1979); see, e.g., Lascaris v. Laredo, 100 Misc. 2d
220, 221-23, 417 N.Y.S.2d 665, 666-67 (1979), legislatures, e.g. Ariz Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 12-847(c) (West 1982), and even the ABA, Abbott, Joint AMA-ABA Guidelines:
Present Status of Serologic Testing in Problems of Disputed Parentage, 10 Fam. L.Q.
247, 257 (1976), have embraced statistics without giving adequate attention to this
problem. The accuracy of modern blood-typing techniques permits the exclusion of
at least 90 % of falsely identified men. That is, rejection of the null hypothesis of non-
paternity is wrong only about 10 % of the time. This does not, however, establish the
probability that the alternative hypothesis is true. It only means that the null hypoth-
esis does not conform well to the data. What then is the probability that a man not
excluded is in fact the father of the child? The answer cannot be derived solely from
the test results. Important assumptions about the number of possible putative fathers
must be made. For a discussion of the misuse of the new testing techniques, see
Ellman & Kaye, Probabilities and Proof: Can HLA and Blood Group Testing Prove
Paternity?, 54 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1131 (1979).
177. For a discussion of the history of the swine flu program, see In re Swine Flu
Immunization Prods. Liab. Litig., 533 F. Supp. 567, 571-72 (D. Colo. 1980).
178. See id. at 572. The government agreed to assume liability because otherwise
the manufacturers would be subject to strict products liability claims for any defects
in the manufacture of the vaccine. Id.
179. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2401(b), 2671-2680 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
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legal sufficiency. They did, however, discuss in detail the judicial
evaluation of the evidence involved.
Epidemiologic analysis figured decisively in most of the swine flu
cases. For example, the court in Heyman v. United States8° rejected
the plaintiff's claim because she attempted to prove her case without
epidemiologic evidence. The court found that clinicians generally
cannot determine "whether a relationship exists between an illness
and a preceding event such as a vaccination,"'' and held that "with-
out at least some reference to epidemiological studies, [the] plaintiffs
position that her illness was caused by the swine flu shot amounts to
nothing more than speculation."' 2
Central to the swine flu litigation was an epidemiologic study that
indicated a relative risk of greater than 2 for Guillain-Barre Syndrome
(GBS) up to ten weeks after swine flu inoculation. 8 3 If the exposed
(vaccinated) population is perfectly defined, a relative risk of 2 corre-
sponds to an attributable risk of 0.50.1s4 The study induced the gov-
ernment to settle almost all cases in which the plaintiff contracted
GBS within ten weeks of his swine flu shot.8 5 Thus, the plaintiffs in
virtually all of the reported cases either contracted GBS more than ten
weeks after their inoculations, or contracted a disease other than GBS.
One of these cases exemplifies the proper use of epidemiology; another
shows the need for an epidemiologic evidentiary standard.
In Cook v. United States,8 6 the plaintiff GBS victims experienced
the onset of the disease approximately twelve weeks after their swine
flu inoculations. 1 7 The district court disallowed their claims after a
detailed and perceptive discussion of the use of epidemiology. 18 The
judge discussed the connection between a relative risk of 2 and the
more-likely-than-not standard, and also determined that the court
should consider the two non-statistical factors of alternative explana-
tions and biological credibility. 189
180. 506 F. Supp. 1145 (S.D. Fla. 1981).
181. Id. at 1149.
182. Id.
183. Schonberger, Bregman, Sullivan-Bolyai, Keenlyside, Ziegler, Retailliau, Ed-
dins & Bryan, Gullian-Barre Syndrome Following Vaccination in the National Influ-
enza Immunization Program, United States, 1976-1977, 110 Am. J. Epidemiology
105, 112-13 (1979). The study also discussed attributable risk, id. at 111-13, but this
was not used in any of the legal analyses.
184. 1(2-1) = .50
1 (2-1)+l
185. Hall & Silbergeld, supra note 5, at 446.
186. 545 F. Supp. 306 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
187. Id. at 307; see Padgett v. United States, 553 F. Supp. 794, 804 (W.D. Tex.
1982).
188. 545 F. Supp. at 315-16.
189. Id. at 314-15.
[Vol. 52
EPIDEMIOLOGIC PROOF
At the other extreme is Sulesky v. United States,19 in which the
plaintiff first exhibited signs of GBS more than three months after her
injection.19' She introduced epidemiologic testimony that conflicted
with a government report that had previously been relied on in many
cases.19 2 This so confused the court that it turned to the testimony of
treating and evaluating physicians, who apparently did not even dis-
cuss the disease's relative rate of occurrence. 193 Nonetheless, the court,
relying on their testimony, held for the plaintiff.194 Without a substan-
tive standard for review, an appellate court faced with the Cook and
Sulesky verdicts would have to uphold both, although only the first
could be rationally explained. This Article's proposal would provide
both trial and appellate courts with the required standard.
C. Qualifications for Expert Witnesses Giving Testimony About
Epidemiology
No court has yet determined the qualifications necessary for a
witness to offer expert testimony about epidemiology. In general, a
witness need only have such "knowledge, skill, experience, training,
or education" in the field at issue to "make it appear that his opinion
' . will probably aid the trier in his search for truth."' 95 In Jenkins v.
United States'96 it was held that a psychologist could, under some
circumstances, give psychiatric testimony. The court cited an earlier
case in which it had been held that "a general practitioner may testify
concerning matters within a medical specialty if his education or
experience, or both, involves demonstrable knowledge of the sub-
ject." 97
Under the Jenkins test and the proposed standard, a medical doctor
could testify about toxic tort causation only if he could demonstrate
knowledge of epidemiology. 9" The preference often accorded treating
physicians should not apply because a standard based on the drawing
of inferences from populations does not require detailed knowledge of
the plaintiff's individual case. Moreover, a medical degree would not
190. 545 F. Supp. 426 (S.D. W. Va. 1982).
191. Id. at 429.
192. Id. at 429-30.
193. See id. at 430-31.
194. Id. at 431.
195. Fed. R. Evid. § 702; see Jenkins v. United States, 307 F.2d 637, 643 (D.C.
Cir. 1962) (quoting McCormick, Law of Evidence § 13 (1954)).
196. 307 F.2d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
197. Id. at 643-44 (citing Sher v. DeHaven, 199 F.2d 777, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1952)).
198. Sufficient knowledge might be established in a number of ways, including
coursework or membership in appropriate professional organizations. In Kubs v.
United States, 537 F. Supp. 560 (E.D. Wis. 1982), a witness' testimony was rejected
in part because the work on which it was based had never been subjected to peer
review. Id. at 562.
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necessarily be required because many epidemiologists do not have
one. The best witness, of course, would be a medical doctor thor-
oughly trained in epidemiology, because the need to integrate biology,
statistics and common sense to draw proper inferences requires as
broad a background as possible.
V. "FIRsT CASE," UNDER-COMPENSATION AND OVER-COMPENSATION
PROBLEMS
A. The "First Case" Problem
The use of epidemiology to determine the legal sufficiency of evi-
dence would eliminate much of the inconsistency and irrationality
from judicial decisions in which the causation of a latent disease is at
issue. It would, however, also make it difficult for victims to prove
causation prior to the development of adequate data, and thus would
create a special problem for early victims. 99 In response to this "first
case" problem, some commentators have proposed scientifically ques-
tionable rules to ease the plaintiff's burden of proof.200 These proposals
would, in effect, remove all rational limits on liability, a step for
which most proponents give no theoretical justification beyond an
unfocused desire to compensate.201
The unlimited liability that would result from relaxed evidentiary
standards is best illustrated by one proposal that would require a
199. Several of the swine flu cases involved claims that diseases such as polymyos-
tis, Tabaczynski v. United States, 529 F. Supp. 156, 161 (E.D. Mich. 1981), aff'd, 711
F.2d 1059 (6th Cir. 1983), or arthritis, Gicas v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 217, 220
(E.D. Wis. 1981), were caused by swine flu inoculations. Most were rejected because
a single isolated temporal coincidence is not sufficient evidence. One expert in
Tabaczynski pointed out that a single case could not support statistical inferences.
529 F. Supp. at 62. But see Hasler v. United States, 517 F. Supp. 1262, 1271 (E.D.
Mich. 1981) (onset of arthritis after inoculation was found not to be a coincidence),
rev'd, 718 F.2d 202 (1983).
The modification of the statute of limitations in several states to allow a plaintiff
to bring an action after a causal relationship is discovered is implicitly based on the
recognition that scientifically establishing causation often requires time for the accu-
mulation of data. See Stoleson v. United States, 629 F.2d 1265, 1269 (7th Cir. 1980).
200. See, e.g., Hall & Silbergeld, supra note 5, at 442-43 (extrapolation of epide-
miologic studies representing unusual subgroups in population to larger group to
establish causation based on assumption that different species react similarly to
different substances); Tort Actions for Cancer, supra note 5, at 855-59 (calling for
government maintenance of a catalog of exposure levels at which particular carcino-
genic substances will cause cancer; presumption of causation is created if plaintiff
can show exposure above the threshold level).
201. See Burcat, supra note 5, at 857-59; Soble, A Proposalfor the Administrative
Compensation of Victims of Toxic Substance Pollution: A Model Act, 14 Harv. J. on
Legis. 683, 768 (1977); Precursor Symptoms, supra note 2, at 194; Environmental
Risks, supra note 5, at 587.
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plaintiff to prove only exposure "significant enough to trigger dis-
ease."202 According to some theories, significance could be found in
very low exposures.20 3 Thus adoption of the proposal could make
nearly everyone potentially liable to countless people. Simply breath-
ing releases traces of suspect organic compounds.20 4
Other proposals would use methods employed in making regulatory
decisions to establish rebuttable presumptions of causation in tort
actions.20 5 Rebuttal, however, would require the same kind of studies
needed to establish causation under the proposed standard. If the
burden of proof were shifted to defendants in this way, the loss, in the
absence of any information on causation, would be transferred to
them.206 Such a change would be at odds with recognized legal princi-
ples.
A clear distinction currently exists between the standard of proof
used in regulation and the standard used in determining tort liability.
Most legislation governing the regulation of potentially toxic sub-
stances requires far less convincing proof of harmfulness than would
satisfy the more-likely-than-not test.2 07 As a result, regulatory agencies
have employed methods that would not meet the proposed test of
evidentiary sufficiency. In particular, agencies have banned or limited
certain substances on the basis of animal studies backed by little, if
any, human data.2 08 This type of analysis may be appropriate in
protective regulation, but it does not satisfy the more-likely-than-not
test209 and should not, as some have argued, carry over to tort cases. 10
202. Hall & Silbergeld, supra note 5, at 445.
203. S. Epstein, The Politics of Cancer 3 (1978).
204. See ABA Section of Science & Technology, Law, Science and Technology in
Health Risk Regulation 11, 22 Jurimetrics J. 380, 381 (1982) (statement of Dr. Leon
Golberg).
205. See supra note 5.
206. See Robinson, supra note 5, at 729 (placement of the burden of proof is
dispositive of factual issue of causation); Rosenberg, supra note 5, at 866 n.65("shifting the burden would simply replace one bias with another").
207. See Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492, 520 (8th Cir. 1975) (reason-
able medical concern for public health suffices to sustain agency action), modified,
529 F.2d 181 (1976); Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 510 F.2d 1292, 1298
(D.C. Cir. 1975) (the standard of "substantial evidence" means something less than
the weight of the evidence); see also Maines, Offensive Collateral Estoppel in Mass
Tort or Products Liability Cases: The Potential for Corporate Catastrophe from
Prior Administrative Proceedings, 35 Admin. L. Rev. 327, 329-30 (1983) (lesser
standard of proof in administrative hearings). But see Industrial Union Dep't v.
American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 653 (1980) (more-likely- than-not test).
208. Environmental Defense Fund V. EPA, 510 F.2d 1292, 1299 (D.C. Cir.
1975).
209. Latin, The "Significance"of Toxic Health Risks: An Essay on Legal Decision-
making Under Uncertainty, 10 Ecology L.Q. 339, 377-80 (1982).
210. Id.
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The pitfalls of making conclusory legal leaps from mouse to man
prevent rational extrapolation even in apparently extreme cases.
Dioxin, for example, is a potent human toxin that may also be a
carcinogen. In animals, its carcinogenic potency exeeds that of afla-
toxin B, known as perhaps the most potent human carcinogen.2 11 Its
toxic effects, however, vary by a factor of 5000 in comparisons be-
tween tests using guinea pigs and hamsters.212 If dose-response infor-
mation for guinea pigs does not apply to another species of rodent,
animal data are obviously not a reliable basis for making quantitative
conclusions about exposed humans.2 13 For regulatory purposes the
existing evidence about dioxin may support the most stringent of
limitations, but statements about likelihood in tort cases require more.
Even within the regulatory context courts have recognized that hu-
man epidemiologic data should be given more weight than the results
of animal testing. In Dow Chemical Co. v. Blum,21 4 an epidemiologic
study, albeit weak, sufficed to sustain an EPA order banning certain
herbicides,2 15 while in Gulf South Insulation v. Consumer Product
Safety Commission,2 1 6 the failure to consider epidemiologic evidence
resulted in the reversal of a ban on the use of urea-formaldehyde foam
insulation..2 1 7
The use of regulatory or other lesser standards in tort actions has
been advocated by at least one proponent as necessary to achieve the
tort system's goals of compensation, deterrence and retributive jus-
tice.218 Relaxing evidentiary standards, however, would serve only the
goal of compensation2 19 and would unjustifiably single out the victims
of certain diseases for special treatment. If society's only concern is
compensation, why should lung cancer victims receive money when
cystic fibrosis or multiple sclerosis victims do not? Even more to the
point, why should a lung cancer victim who can demonstrate an
exposure speculatively related to the disease receive compensation
when other victims do not? If compensation is the only goal, it is best
uncoupled from tort liability.
In addition to creating a crazy-quilt pattern of payments to disease
victims, focusing only on compensation would seriously impair the
211. Friedman & Weckesser, Dioxin and Resource Recovery, Envtl. F., Sept.
1983, at 44, 46.
212. Rawls, Dioxin's Human Toxicity is Most Difficult Problem, Chem. & Eng'g
News, June 6, 1983, at 37; see Mays, Dioxin: Deadly or Deceptive?, Envtl. F., Feb.
1984, at 13, 14.
213. See Mays, supra note 212, at 13-14.
214. 469 F. Supp. 892 (E.D. Mich. 1979).
215. Id. at 907.
216. 701 F.2d 1137 (5th Cir. 1983)
217. See id. at 1146.
218. Environmental Risks, supra note 5, at 575.
219. Id.
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other goals of the tort system. Retribution unrelated to fault and
causation is meaningless. As to deterrence, defendants would have
little incentive to alter their conduct because they would be held liable
to many victims even when they did not in fact cause their injuries.
Most potential targets of toxic tort litigation are industrial concerns,
but cancer and other latent diseases would continue to occur even if
they completely ceased production. Far fewer cancers are tied to
specific substances or activities than many have assumed. 2
220. It is generally estimated that 60-90 % of all cancers are linked in some way to
the environment. Sixth Annual Report of the Council on Environmental Quality 33
(1975). This does not mean, however, that prevention of 60-90 % is practicable. See
Doll & Peto, supra note 55, at 1205-07; Higginson & Muir, Environmental Carcino-
genesis: Misconceptions and Limitations to Cancer Control, 63 J. Nat'l Cancer Inst.
1291, 1296 (1979). Nor does it mean that man-made chemicals cause most cases of
the disease, as some have concluded. See Tort Actions for Cancer, supra note 5, at
840-41. Even were this true, it would not justify relaxing evidentiary standards to
facilitate almost universal recovery against chemical manufacturers when specific
chemicals are not implicated.
Despite the complexity of environmental carcinogenesis, advocates of reducing the
plaintiff's burden of proof have based their proposals in part on estimates that 20-
40 % of all cancers result from workplace exposures. The source of this estimate and
its infiltration into legal commentary is an interesting story in itself. In 1978 a group
of scientists from several federal agencies put together a report that contained the 20-
40% figures. Occupational Factors, supra note 93, at 22. This report was widely
criticized, and at least two of the authors later conceded that they had "relied on
some assumptions about data that have been shown subsequently to be incorrect."
Davis, Bridbord & Schneiderman, Estimating Cancer Causes: Problems in Method-
ology, Production, and Trends, 9 Banbury Rep. 285, 308 (1981). Nonetheless the
estimates were defended by others, including Dr. Samuel Epstein, one of the most
vocal critics of the American industrial establishment's use and control of suspect
substances. Epstein & Swartz, Fallacies of Lifestyle Cancer Theories, 289 Nature 127
(1981). Dr. Epstein's book, The Politics of Cancer, supra note 203, formed the basis
for many of the assertions on which one of the proposals for shifting the burden of
proof was based. See Tort Actions for Cancer, supra note 5, at 848-50 (analysis
focusing on the overall relationship of cancers to chemicals but implicitly incorporat-
ing Dr. Epstein's use of the high occupational estimates); Note, Occupationally
Induced Cancer Susceptibility: Regulating the Risk, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 697, 697 n.3
(1983) (dealing with regulation rather than tort law, citing the original 20-40%
estimate). Thus, legal commentators persist in propagating scientific overstatement.
To obtain such high figures, one must unrealistically assume that all workers are
exposed to potential carcinogens at the highest reported rates. See Doll & Peto, supra
note 55, at 1240-41. One realistic epidemiologic analysis of the occupational cancer
issue indicates that 4% is a far more appropriate estimate. Id. at 1245. Other
reasonable estimates range from 1% to 10 %. Wynder & Gori, supra note 55, at 830.
It has not been determined what portion of this 1-10 % receives legal compensation,
but it is clear that for occupationally-caused cancer the potential for tort system
dysfunction is, at worst, far less than the actual dysfunction assumed by supporters of
relaxed standards. Furthermore, environmental exposures are generally much less
concentrated than those experienced in the workplace, indicating that the overall
dysfunction is exaggerated as well.
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Thus, the first case problem does not warrant changes in tort law
principles. It does, however, still require that the difficulty of collect-
ing sufficient data to satisfy an evidentiary standard derived from
epidemiology be addressed. There are legal and institutional reforms
that would reduce this burden without compromising principles or
creating unlimited liability. One of the most irrational barriers to
recovery results when the statute of limitations precludes a claim
because a disease manifests itself too long after exposure, 221 or when
scientific knowledge linking exposure and disease comes too late after
manifestation. As is already the law in many states, 222 the statutory
period should commence with a plaintiffs illness, if the causal link is
known at that time, or when causation becomes reasonably appar-
ent.2
23
Another appropriate legal reform would be the adoption of proce-
dural changes at the state level that would facilitate joint collection of
evidence by plaintiffs. Within the federal court system, consolidation
of cases for purposes of discovery has already proven useful in mass
personal injury cases.22 4 So, too, has the federal class action device.2 25
221. See, e.g., Steinhardt v. Johns-Manville Corp., 54 N.Y.2d 1008, 430 N.E.2d
1297, 446 N.Y.S.2d 244 (1981). In Steinhardt, the New York Court of Appeals held
that an action for disease resulting from occupational exposure to asbestos was barred
by the statute of limitations because it was commenced more than four years after the
plaintiff's last employment-related exposure. Id. at 1010, 430 N.E.2d at 1298-99, 446
N.Y.S.2d at 245-46.
222. Annot., 1 A.L.R. 4th 117, 127-34 (1980).
223. See, e.g., Large v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 707 F.2d 94, 96-97 (4th Cir. 1983);
Grabowski v. Turner & Newell, 516 F. Supp. 114, 118-20 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 651 F.2d
908 (3d Cir. 1980) (per curiam). Locke v. Johns-Manville Corp., 221 Va. 951, 958-
59, 275 S.E.2d 900, 905 (1981). For a discussion of this rule as applied in federal
courts, see Davis v. United States, 642 F.2d 328, 331 (9th Cir. 1981), a case involving
polio vaccine. The Davis court refused to delay tolling of the statute until negligence
as well as causation was discovered.
224. E.g., In re Swine Flu Immunization Prods. Liab. Litig., 446 F. Supp. 244,
246 (J.P.M.D.L. 1978) (per curiam), vacated, 687 F.2d 14 (1982); In re A.H. Robins
Co., "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 419 F. Supp. 710, 712 (J.P.M.D.L.
1976) (per curiam); In re A.H. Robins Co., "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods. Liab. Litig.,
406 F. Supp. 540, 542 (J.P.M.D.L. 1975) (per curiam); see Note, The Judicial Panel
and the Conduct of Multidistrict Litigation, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1001, 1002-09 (1974).
225. E.g., In re Three Mile Island Litig., 87 F.R.D. 433, 442 (M.D. Pa. 1980);
Payton v. Abbott Labs., 83 F.R.D. 382, 387-88 (D. Mass. 1979). Other cases have
denied class certification. E.g., In re Northern Dist. of Cal., Dalkon Shield IUD
Prods. Liab. Litig., 693 F.2d 847, 850-51 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
817 (1983); In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175, 1182-83 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 342 (1982); Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 84 F.R.D. 230, 234 (D.S.C.
1979); see Seltzer, Punitive Damages in Mass Tort Litigation: Addressing the Prob-
lems of Fairness, Efficiency and Control, 52 Fordham L. Rev. 37, 69-71 (1983). For
a good bibliography on class actions, see McGovern, Management of Multiparty
Toxic Tort Litigation: Case Law and Trends Affecting Case Management, 19 Forum
1, 9 n.18 (1983).
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Not all states permit such combined efforts, and to the extent that they
do not, more liberal rules should be adopted. -2 6
Of course, scientific research is not optimally conducted with the
primary aim of preparing data for litigation. For the long term, a
coordinated research effort is required, an effort which certain institu-
tional changes would promote. Increased funding for governmental
agencies that collect and analyze epidemiologic data would be a first
step, but government agencies should not do all the work.227 The
establishment of a fund for research at universities or by other rela-
tively disinterested private sector individuals or groups would diver-
sify the information gathering effort. This fund could be provided at
least in part by interested industries. Few institutional mechanisms for
such participation now exist, but a number of changes are possible.
These range from direct payments by industry for research, made
perhaps in conjunction with labor unions, to the establishment of an
umbrella organization to distribute money paid according to some
form of cost allocation system.2 28
226. 301(e) Study, supra note 3, at 257.
227. See Letter of Lilienfeld' & Lilienfeld to the editors of Science, 198 Science
250-53 (Oct. 21, 1977) (suggesting a sort of Brookings Institution for science).
228. Research will not, of course, solve all causation problems, but even initial
studies may have legal uses. In the case of some occupational diseases, it may be
possible to establish a relationship between working in a particular industry and the
incidence of the diseases, though great care must be exercised in interpreting the
data. In one Finnish study of how cancer incidence varied by occupation, almost all
of the differences were found to be associated with different cigarette consumption
habits of the people who tended to go into the occupations under investigation.
Pukkala, Teppo, Hakulinen & Rimpela, Occupation and Smoking as Risk Determi-
nants of Lung Cancer, 12 Int'l J. Epidemiology 290, 293-95 (1983). For an example
of how the performance of certain tasks within an occupation may be implicated, see
American Iron & Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 577 F.2d 825, 832 (3d Cir. 1978) (relationship
between lung cancer and exposure to coke oven emissions), cert. dismissed, 448 U.S.
917 (1980).
Evidence derived from occupational studies can facilitate proof within the work-
ers' compensation context even without identifying a particular substance, and it can
assist in further pinpointing the cause. The rubber industry provides an excellent
example of how research studies can be done through industry-university cooperation
without government funding or coercion. The 1970 union contract with the rubber
industry provided for a comprehensive occupational research program. The Schools
of Public Health at Harvard University and the University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill contracted with both the United Rubber Workers and the major U.S.
rubber companies to do the work. They found, among other things, that certain
cancers were more common in rubber workers than in the general population,
though overall, the excess mortality for all cancers was minimal. See McMichael,
Andjelkovic & Tyroler, Cancer Mortality Among Rubber Workers: An Epidemio-
logic Study, 271 Annals of the N.Y. Acad. of Science 125, 136 (1976); Monson &
Fine, Cancer Mortality and Morbidity Among Rubber Workers, 61 J. Nat'l Cancer
Inst. 1047 (1978). Similar industry-wide efforts should be encouraged in the future.
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In addition to increasing and improving research, steps to insure
better investigation of suspect cases of certain diseases could also be
taken. The interests of society have already led to statutory require-
ments that certain deaths of unclear origin automatically fall under
the jurisdiction of a coroner. These requirements greatly aid in collect-
ing the information necessary to determine or prove if a crime has
been committed. Similarly, to insure that occurrences of a disease
possibly related to a toxic tort are properly and adequately docu-
mented, they should, by statute, come within the coroner's or some
other health officer's jurisdiction.22 9 This would not only make it
easier to determine causation in the particular case under investiga-
tion, but would also generate data for general use in drawing epide-
miologic inferences.
B. Under-Compensation and Over-Compensation
In some circumstances an epidemiologic standard would cause a
radical shift from non-compensation to over-compensation. Until suf-
ficient evidence of causation is developed, all plaintiffs would lose;
afterwards, assuming there exists adequate proof of exposure and
other necessary elements of the legal theory being pursued, all would
likely win.2 30 To avoid this dichotomy, and to allow some recovery
when the burden of proof is not met, a few commentators have
suggested proportional recovery.2 31
Under the proportional approach, if thirty percent of the a priori
risk of a disease were attributable to a defendant, the plaintiff would
recover thirty percent of his damages from that defendant. Likewise,
229. Autopsy of all deaths should be encouraged. Autopsy, which often reveals
false diagnoses, is now on the decline in the United States, a trend that should be
reversed. See Lundberg, Autopsies as the Doctor's-and Patient's-Best Friend, J.
A.M.A., September 2, 1983, reprinted in Baltimore Sun, Oct. 30, 1983, at K5.
230. Whether collateral estoppel on the issue of causation would be applied is an
open question. The issue has been considered in the context of the asbestos litigation.
See Baldwin, Asbestos Litigation and Collateral Estoppel, 17 Forum 772, 781-83
(1982); Comment, An Examination of Recurring Issues in Asbestos Litigation, 46
Alb. L. Rev. 1307, 1330-31 (1982); Note, Applying Offensive Collateral Estoppel to
Asbestos Case: A Viable Alternative, 16 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 687, 702-06 (1982). Even
without collateral estoppel, however, once sufficient evidence is collected for one
case, it will probably be available for use in other cases. See McGovern, supra note
225, at 8. This militates against hasty expansion of the scope of collateral estoppel.
See generally Maines, supra note 207 (discussing problems that might be created by
expansion of the scope of collateral estoppel based on administrative findings).
231. See, e.g., Estep, supra note 57, at 281-86; Rizzo & Arnold, supra note 5, at
1407-13; Robinson, supra note 5, at 743-49. One recent proposal for proportional
recovery would combine the concept with rebuttable presumptions. Environmental
Risks, supra note 5, at 614-15. For the reasons discussed supra notes 135-42, this
proposal is highly questionable.
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if the risk were seventy percent, recovery would be limited to that
percentage of the damages. Such verdicts are not possible today.2 32
Although some courts have apportioned liability among several de-
fendants when the harmfulness of the substance involved was not at
issue, 2 33 no such award has ever been based on the probability of
harmfulness.2 34
Proportional recovery would shift the focus of legal analysis from
the individual case to the tortfeasor who has caused many, but not all,
injuries. It would allow some plaintiffs to recover who, given perfect
information, would not. It would also mean something less than
complete recovery for those who would receive full compensation
under the traditional rules. The tortfeasor would pay the full cost of
the damage it had caused, but not necessarily to the parties it actually
injured. One commentator has described this result as being "actuari-
ally fair, 2 35 and another has justified it on the ground that the law
should prefer inexact justice to manifest injustice.2 36
Whether proportional recovery would in fact be more just than the
present all-or-nothing rule remains an open question. Adoption of the
theory would not dramatically reduce the difficulties faced by toxic
tort plaintiffs. Its rational implementation would require epidemio-
logic evidence similar to that required to satisfy the proposed stan-
dard. Attributable risks of less than fifty percent would not preclude
recovery, but data to support reasonable estimates of attributable risk
would still be required.
The net effect of proportional recovery would depend on factors
that require further investigation and research. The feasibility of
detecting small attributable risks must be determined. It must also be
determined whether more cases involve attributable risks above fifty
percent or below fifty percent. If relatively small impacts on incidence
rates defy detection, a theory intended to assist plaintiffs who cannot
232. Apportionment today depends primarily on the nature of the plaintiffs
injury, rather than on the conduct of defendants. See W. Prosser, supra note 11, § 52,
at 314.
233. A good example is Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163
Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980), a DES case in which the court used
a "market share" theory of liability. Id. at 611-13, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at
145; see Comment, DES and a Proposed Theory of Enterprise Liability, 46 Fordham
L. Rev. 963, 995-1000 (1978). But see Sheffield v. Eli Lilly & Co., 144 Cal. App. 3d
583, 592-99, 192 Cal. Rptr. 870, 875-80 (1983) (refusing to apply the market share
theory).
234. One court, however, by denying a defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment, implied that the Sindell theory might apply to the issue of harmfulness as well
as to identity of the party responsible for exposing the plaintiff. Pereira v. Dow
Chem. Co., 129 Cal. App. 3d 865, 872-73, 181 Cal. Rptr. 364, 368 (1982).
235. Robinson, supra note 5, at 747.
236. Delgado, supra note 5, at 895.
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meet the more-likely-than-not test would actually do them little good,
and what relief it did provide would come at the expense of other
plaintiffs who would recover more under the traditional test as incor-
porated in the proposed standard. If in the majority of cases, the
attributable risk is above fifty percent, adoption of the theory might
do more injustice than justice, even if small impacts were detectable.
These potential problems may prove to be more imagined than real,
but until they have been carefully researched and considered, the law
should not rush to embrace the theory of proportional recovery.23 7
CONCLUSION
In both toxic tort and cancer cases, courts have generally done a
poor job in determining whether evidence of causation is sufficient to
meet the plaintiff's burden of proof. Failure to formulate and apply
substantive standards has led to irrational and inconsistent results, a
problem that need not continue. Accepted legal principles governing
the burden of proof, combined with the principles of epidemiology
provide an excellent basis for a standard that rationally conforms to
general tort law principles and for which there is ample precedent.
Requiring that a plaintiff's evidence satisfy the postulates of epide-
miology would work to the disadvantage of the first victims of a
237. For single-factor cases, the traditional preponderance of the evidence rule
may, as a practical matter, be the best possible standard. Multiple factor cases,
however, present additional issues. Consider a plaintiff who has suffered high level
exposures to a number of substances, each produced by a different defendant. If the
plaintiff has a disease linked to all the substances, proving by a preponderance of the
evidence that any single defendant caused it may be difficult. Depending on the
levels of exposure and the relative risks for the substances considered separately, each
defendant might escape liability only because of the other defendants.
The alternative liability theory, developed in Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 84-
86, 199 P.2d 1, 2-5 (1948), would not apply to such a situation unless extended. See
Molloy & Thomas, Causation Problems in Design Defect Litigation, Legal Notes &
Viewpoints, Feb. 1983, at 35, 44-45 (the doctrine has only rarely been applied in
product liability cases). In many toxic tort cases, strict liability rather than negli-
gence is involved, and it is uncertain if all potential defendants have been included.
With few exceptions, the case law indicates that this makes alternative liability
inapplicable. Other theories formulated to reach multiple defendants would also not
apply. These theories are: (1) "concert of action," requiring a common plan or
design, which will not often occur in multiple defendant toxic tort cases involving
multiple substances; (2) "enterprise liability," requiring industry-wide standards
which, unless a single product such as blasting caps is implicated, is unlikely to be
useful, and which would therefore be inapplicable in multiple-substance cases; and
(3) "market share liability," which is the theory adopted in Sindell v. Abbott Labs.,
26 Cal. 3d 588, 611-13, 607 P.2d 924, 936-38, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 144-45 (1980). It is
difficult to see how a single relevant market could be defined for multiple substances,
and thus how the theory could apply to cases involving more than one substance.
Thus, some form of causal apportionment among the defendants might well be the
best way to allocate liability in a case involving multiple high-level exposures, though
further research is required.
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substance that eventually proves to have harmful effects. The magni-
tude of this problem is not, however, as great as many have assumed,
and the legal and institutional reforms appropriate to its solution do
not involve reducing the plaintiff's burden of proof. Using an epidemi-
ologic standard could cause a sharp shift from under- to over-compen-
sation, but adoption of a proportional recovery standard to ameliorate
this problem could create even more serious problems. Further theo-
retical development of this concept is necessary before it can be rec-
ommended. In any event, consistent and rational resolution of toxic
tort claims requires that the law incorporate the principles of epidemi-
ology and that legal reforms conform to epidemiologic reality.
